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I. INTRODUCTION
Thompson Reuters and Georgetown Law’s collaborative
publication, The Report on the State of the Legal Market 2016 (“2016
Report”), opens with a brief case study of the Kodak company.1 The
report describes Kodak as the camera and film market-maker during
the 1970s and 1980s.2 During those decades, Kodak controlled “80
percent of the market for the chemicals and paper used to develop
and print photos.”3 But when the market switched to digital, Kodak
failed to respond. Futurist and innovation advisor Chunka Mui
categorized this missed opportunity as one of history’s most
staggering corporate blunders.4 Law firms need to heed the warning
from the 2016 Report that Kodak was one of many ”well-established
companies being blindsided by technological developments that
oust[ed] them from their positions of market leadership.”5 Kodak
even invented the very technology that led to its downfall.6 Kodak’s
problem, according to author Richard Randall, is the same problem
that plagued Borders bookstore and Blockbuster video rental—
namely, wanting to take on the competition while maintaining
traditional business.7 While Kodak’s competitors were establishing
footholds in digital photography, Kodak was distracted by its
continued focus on the film market.8
The Kodak story is a cautionary tale for law firms. The 2016
Report warns that law firms’ adjustments to significant and
permanent market changes are largely passive and reactive.9 The
2016 Report finds that “very few firms have been willing to engage
1.

See GEO. L. & THOMSON REUTERS, PEER MONITOR, 2016 REPORT ON THE STATE
LEGAL MARKET 1 (2016), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/
upload/2016_PM_GT_Final-Report.pdf [hereinafter 2016 REPORT].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Chunka Mui, How Kodak Failed, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2012), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/chunkamui/2012/01/18/how-kodak-failed/.
5. 2016 REPORT, supra note 1.
6. Mui, supra note 4. Steve Sasson, an engineer at Kodak, invented the first
digital camera in 1975. Id. He says Kodak’s response was, “that’s cute—but don’t tell
anyone about it.” Id.
7. See generally Richard Randall, Kodak’s Failure to Exploit its Digital Edge is a
Lesson on Complacency, CENT. PENN BUS. J. (Oct. 14, 2011), http://
www.cpbj.com/article/20111014/CPBJ01/111019870/the-whiteboard-kodaksfailure-to-exploit-its-digital-edge-is-a-lesson-on-complacency.
8. Id.
9. 2016 REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
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proactively in the consideration or implementation of the kinds of
operational changes that would be required to respond effectively to
the changed expectations of their clients.”10 Law firms who fail to
react to the indisputable legal market changes are choosing to
ignore reality.11 Instead of attempting to convince readers to act, the
authors of this article provide suggestions for readers about how to
act. The 2016 Report’s finding that law firm partners are reluctant
to move away from “an economic model that has served them very
well over the years and that continues to produce good results today”
is a harsh analog to Borders’ and Blockbuster’s addiction to physical
stores and Kodak’s commitment to film.12 Such reluctance “could
result in law firms failing to respond to trends that over time could
well challenge their traditional market positions.”13
Importantly, failing to respond does not always look like
inactivity. In fact, organizations can be very active while failing to
respond to market changes. Donald Sull calls this “active inertia.”14
This occurs when, “stuck in the modes of thinking and working that
brought success in the past, market leaders simply accelerate all of
their tried-and-true activities.”15 If the industry is at “an inflection
point, old ways of measuring success can lead to a sharp decline—or
failure.”16 Sull challenges leaders to avoid assuming that paralysis is
the only enemy, and to recognize that action can be just as
dangerous. “Instead of rushing to ask, ‘What should we do?’
managers should pause to ask, ‘what hinders us?’”17
To survive, law firms must not rely on their old ways of
conducting business. As Marshall Goldsmith wrote, “What got you
10. Id.
11. Id. (“The current challenge in the legal market is not that firms are
unaware of the threat posed to their current business model by the dramatic shift
in the demands and expectations of their clients. Instead, as in the case of Kodak,
the challenge is that firms are choosing not to act in response to the threat, even
though they are fully aware of its ramifications.”).
12. Id.; see also RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
YOUR FUTURE 62 (Oxford U. Press 2d ed. 2017) (“[I]t will be hard to convince a
room full of millionaires that they have their business model wrong.”).
13. 2016 REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
14. Donald N. Sull, Why Good Companies Go Bad, HARV. BUS. REV. 43 (Aug.
1999), https://hbr.org/1999/07/why-good-companies-go-bad.
15. Id.
16. Bertolini Duncan & Waldeck, Knowing When To Reinvent, HARV. BUS. REV.
93 (Dec. 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/12/knowing-when-to-reinvent; see also Wald,
infra note 230, at 93 (stating the legal market’s inflection point was back in 2008).
17. Sull, supra note 14, at 50.
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here won’t get you there.”18 But the lesson learned from active
inertia is that paralysis is not your worst enemy. The solution is for
an organization to break the pattern of management-by-reaction,
and begin to “reposition[] the core business while actively investing
in the new growth business.”19 There are two questions for law
firms—How is the market changing, and how do we change our law
firm?
The authors will answer this question in four parts. First, the
authors provide an overview of some current key market changes.20
Second, the authors describe the prevailing leadership structure in
law firms and challenge the preference for promoting a successful
partner to the most senior management seat.21 The authors propose
an alternative that does not eliminate senior lawyer leadership, but
adds a successful professional manager in the chief operating officer
role, leading a team of operations directors and collaborating with
lawyer-leaders. Third, the authors describe the characteristics of the
operations team and the qualities of the leader.22 Lastly, the article
explains how organizations change.23 The purpose of this section is
not only to acknowledge difficulties associated with change, but to
demonstrate that leadership and management can work together.
Accordingly, existing models provide guideposts for law firms to
follow.
II. CHANGES IN THE LEGAL MARKETPLACE
The legal market is changing, and reasonable minds disagree
about the many ways to describe the nature of phenomena identified
as market change. A technical innovation on its own is not a market
change; it is the application of the innovation by market participants
that makes the market change. It is important to note that the
language used to describe markets is not always clear. This is

18. MARSHALL GOLDSMITH & MARK REITER, WHAT GOT YOU HERE WON’T GET
YOU THERE: HOW SUCCESSFUL PEOPLE BECOME EVEN MORE SUCCESSFUL! (Hyperion
2007).
19. Scott Anthony & Evan I. Schwartz, What the Best Transformational Leaders Do,
HARV. BUS. REV. (May 8, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/05/what-the-besttransformational-leaders-do.
20. Infra Part II.
21. Infra Part III.
22. Infra Part IV.
23. Infra Part V.
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especially true when discussing a market distinguished by the rapid
introduction and uptake of innovative influences.
Consider the example of Online Dispute Resolution (“ODR”):
the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Task Force on E-Commerce
defines the technical innovation ODR as “a broad term that
encompasses many forms of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”)
that incorporate the use of the internet, websites, email
communications, streaming media, and other information
technology as part of the dispute resolution process.”24 Although
ODR is not new, it is a force impacting contemporary legal practice.25
While ODR has its critics, the criticism is aimed at its practice, not at
its potential.26 While ODR is a bona fide innovation that will impact
law firms, it is not clear that ODR is a market force. It is not the goal
of this section to sort out ODR’s position on the ambiguous
continuum of trends, disruptions, innovations, or market
characteristics. The goal of this section is only to identify some
examples of law firms’ experiences in the present market. The
following sections outline current legal market changes.
A. Decreasing Demand for Lawyers Within Law Firms
Decreasing demand is an umbrella topic that could include all
that is ominous in the future for law firms. The decrease is specific
to the demand for services provided by lawyers within law firms. The
legal market is not shrinking; there is not a society-wide decrease in
legal problems. People and organizations still encounter problems
that require legal solutions, and they still need practitioners with
expertise in achieving legal solutions. But those practitioners are no
longer strictly lawyers and they are no longer found strictly in law
24. American Bar Ass’n Task Force on E-Commerce and ADR, Addressing
Disputes in Electronic Commerce, 1 (Aug. 2002), www.abanet.org/dispute/documents
/FinalReport102802.pdf.
25. SUSSKIND, supra note 12, at 121 (“ODR will prove to be a disruptive
technology that fundamentally changes the work of traditional litigators and
judges.”); see Victor Li, Is Online Dispute Resolution the Wave of the Future?, A.B.A. J.
(Mar. 18, 2016, 1:00 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
is_online_dispute_resolution_the_wave_of_the_future.
26. See Pietro Ortolani, Self-Enforcing Online Dispute Resolution: Lessons from
Bitcoin, 35 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD., 595, 600–02 (“[N]ational ODR schemes are
unlikely to affirm themselves as a comprehensive vehicle for the resolution of ecommerce disputes. [However,] ODR schemes can establish themselves as
appropriate venues for the resolution of online disputes if the goal of selfenforcement is attained.”).
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firms.27 This means that law firms are getting a smaller share of the
legal work.
In the second edition of his book, Tomorrow’s Lawyers, Richard
Susskind identifies three phenomena that are driving change in the
legal market.28 These three drivers all have the same result: less work
for lawyers in law firms. The first driver is that corporate legal
departments are being asked to do more with less.29 The “less” part
of this equation is that clients are reducing headcount while
spending more on outside counsel.30 The “more” part is more work
for lawyers.31 Opportunities exist for law firms that can deliver more
for less through efficiency, rather than lowering the billable rate or
providing arbitrary discounts.32
The second driver is liberalization, which describes a loosening
of restrictions on law firm ownership eligibility, specifically the
general prohibition against non-lawyers owning (or holding any
ownership interest in) a law firm.33 As liberalization takes root, nonlawyers find opportunities to provide legal services (such as Limited
License Legal Technicians in Washington state).34 The people who
use these opportunities and take market share from lawyers in law
firms are not lawyers first; they are entrepreneurs and business

27. See, e.g., Legal Technicians: A New Option for Affordable Legal Services, WASH.
STATE BAR ASS’N, http://www.wsba.org/licensing-and-lawyer-conduct/limitedlicenses/legal-technicians (last visited Oct. 2, 2017).
28. SUSSKIND, supra note 12, at 3.
29. Id. at 4.
30. Cf. id.
31. Cf. id.
32. See A.B.A., Billing for Professional Fees, Disbursements and Other Expenses, 1–6
(Dec. 6, 1993), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/Gen
practice/resources/costrecovery/ABA_CommEthics_Opinion.authcheckdam.pdf.
The elephant in the room, and the topic which would betray intellectual honesty if
avoided, is (at best) inefficiency and (at worst) churning. Id. (defining the term
“churn” to describe overbilling: “. . . continuous toil on or overstaffing a project for
the purpose of churning out hours is also not properly considered ‘earning’ one’s
fees.”). To the extent that firms operate inefficiently or intentionally overbill, that
practice is going to stop. The gravy train of the 1980s and 1990s has long stopped
rolling, but plenty of firms still pass along various forms of waste to their clients.
That waste needs to stop and be reversed—the processes which took too long and
which make the bills go up, are going give way to processes that take less time.
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_res
ponsibility/formal_opinion_11_461_nm.authcheckdam.pdf
33. SUSSKIND, supra note 12, at 5.
34. Legal Technicians, supra note 27.
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people first.35 They are better at running a business than lawyers and
provide an affordable alternative to traditional legal services.36
Susskind’s third driver is technology. Technology does not just
increase efficiency, it also enables innovation—allowing “us to
perform tasks that previously were not possible (or even
imaginable).”37 This cannot be overstated. The business of delivering
legal services is going to change in ways that no one sees coming.
Even if law firms are prepared for every technical innovation that has
been featured in industry publications, that would not be enough
because technology will bring change that no one thought was
possible.
Susskind provides the example of Google artificial intelligence
(AlphaGo), which unexpectedly beat one of the world’s best Go
players.38 Go is a board game which is vastly more complex than
chess; in fact the number of possible moves in Go is “beyond
imagination and renders any thought of exhaustively evaluating all
possible moves utterly and completely unrealistic.”39 AlphaGo was
“trained on 30 million board positions from 160,000 real-life games
taken from a go database.”40 It then played games against itself,
testing how likely a particular move might lead to a win.41 It
repeatedly played these games against itself, learning from each
decision.42 This allowed the machine to execute self-created moves
against a human adversary; these moves were not programmed by a
human.43 The machine innovated so that no human could have
predicted how it would act.44 This is the level of technical innovation
that Susskind writes will “disrupt and radically transform the way
lawyers and courts operate.”45

35. See Michael W. Unger, The Only Thing We Have to Fear . . ., BENCH & BAR OF
MINN. (Nov. 6, 2015), http://mnbenchbar.com/2015/11/the-only-thing-we-haveto-fear/.
36. Id.
37. SUSSKIND, supra note 12, at 15.
38. Id.
39. Christof Koch, How the Computer Beat the Go Master, SCI. AM. (Mar. 19, 2016),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-the-computer-beat-thegomaster/.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. SUSSKIND, supra note 12, at 15.
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B. Disaggregated Legal Services
The disaggregation of legal services refers to the process of
breaking down legal work into its component parts. “Clients are . . .
more prepared than ever before to disaggregate matters, to retain
work in-house, and to bring in additional (even non-traditional)
service providers—all in an effort to reduce costs and improve
efficiency.”46 “Legal services traditionally have been regarded as
relatively ‘bundled,’ in the sense that they consist of tightly linked
elements that cannot be easily separated.”47 But Richard Susskind
writes, “for any deal or dispute, no matter how small or large, it is
possible to break it down, to ‘decompose’ the work, into a set of
constituent tasks.”48 Breaking work down is a fundamental
component of project management that creates a key project
deliverable, called a Work Breakdown Structure (“WBS”). The WBS
is a hierarchical decomposition of the total scope of the project
team’s work to accomplish the project objectives and create the
required deliverables.49 The WBS organizes and defines the total
scope of the project, and represents the work specified in the current
approved project scope statement.50 One of the tools and techniques
used in creating WBS is decomposition, which is “a technique used
for dividing and subdividing the project scope and project
deliverables into smaller, more manageable parts.”51
Disaggregated legal services impact law firms in two ways. First,
“[c]lients can unbundle litigation work and ‘right source’ to the firm
such projects as large-scale document and data review at a
dramatically lower cost.”52 The unbundled services are processed by
a legal process outsourcer (“LPO”).53 Once a project is referred, the

46. 2016 REPORT, supra note 1, at 16.
47. Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous
Boundaries: The Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2148 (2010).
48. SUSSKIND, supra note 12, at 32.
49. Work Breakdown Structure, WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE, http://www.work
breakdownstructure.com/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
50. PROJECT MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, A GUIDE TO THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT
BODY OF KNOWLEDGE 125 (5th ed. 2013).
51. Id. at 128.
52. Clayton M. Christensen, Dina Wang & Derek van Bever, Consulting on the
Cusp of Disruption: The Industry that has Long Helped Others Sidestep Strategic Threats is
Itself Being Upended, 91 HARV. BUS. REV. 106, 109 (Oct. 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/
10/consulting-on-the-cusp-of-disruption.
53. Id.
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LPO then “coordinates this discovery work with the higher-value
services of lead counsel, who focus on the less routine aspects of
litigation.”54 In this way, the work is never touched by a traditional
law firm.
The second way that disaggregation impacts a law firm occurs
when other firms are unbundling legal services and down-streaming
lower-value work to lower-cost resources (either inside or outside the
firm).55 This creates a cost-advantage, which in turn, provides a
competitive advantage.56 Traditional law firms are developing these
practices, as are new firms which are forming with disaggregation as
a business model.57 These firms can include their disaggregation
capabilities in marketing pitches, and some clients may even ask for
examples of such efficiencies in their requests for proposals.
Of course, simply unbundling legal services does not make the
aggregated deliverable more efficient. There is a certain amount of
administrative overhead involved with coordinating service
providers. “The absence of such coordination can make production
more expensive and prone to error than if the company had
retained the fixed overhead costs associated with remaining more
vertically integrated.”58 Law firms have an opportunity to solve this
problem by acting as the coordinators of these various service
providers. Additionally, to sensibly design or adopt a disaggregated
solution, the economics must make sense, the costs must be
evaluated, and the processes must be measured. This leads to the
next change, which underpins many of the other changes: data
analysis.
C. Data Analysis
Peter Drucker famously said (or perhaps famously didn’t say,
although the famous adage is often attributed to him), “What gets
measured gets managed.”59 While there is nothing new about
54. Id. at 110.
55. Id. at 111.
56. See id.
57. For example, some large firms will create lower-paid staff attorney positions
within a practice group to make certain services cheaper. See, e.g., FREDRIKSON &
BYRON IMMIGRATION TEAM, https://www.fredlaw.com/practices__industries/
immigration/#group_3_65784 (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
58. Regan & Heenan, supra note 47, at 2160.
59. Paul Barnett, If What Gets Measured Gets Managed, Measuring the Wrong Thing
Matters, CORP. FINANCE REV. 1, 1 (2015).
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generating and evaluating business metrics, law firms are
characteristically slow in adopting data analysis. It is true that most
law firms track a number of metrics such as utilization60 and
realization, 61 and compare those numbers across years, practice
areas, and individual lawyers. But the data analysis we refer to is
beyond traditional law firm metrics, and, dare we say, amounts to big
data.62 In a 2016 survey, only “34% of [responding law firms]
indicated they would utilize business intelligence and analytics-type
technologies to address firm management, new business and client
challenges.”63 In the 2015 version of that same survey, “49% of all
respondents said they had no plans to use big data technologies.”64
Big data is characterized by two qualities: size and complexity.
“Big data is the collection of data sets so large and complex that it
becomes difficult to process using standard databases and data
processing tools/techniques.”65 In other words, a program such as
Microsoft Excel cannot process such large data. As data analytics
methods and resources have become more accessible, clients have
adopted the techniques to measure and manage their businesses.
Clients are using analytics to understand their legal expenditures,
both internal and external, and to understand the services and
outcomes that their dollars are buying.66 This analysis enables clients
to identify the sources of the best work at the best price. As clients
demand specific services and lower fees from outside counsel, law
firms may be tempted to react by lowering their price, often by
applying an arbitrary percentage or flat-rate discount. Without
appropriate data analytics to support these pricing decisions, firms
may base their prices on whatever the client asks for, whatever the

60. The percentage of worked hours which are billed.
61. The percentage of billed hours that are paid.
62. See Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Big Data: Big Pain or Big Gain for
Lawyers?, 39 No.4 L. PRAC. 24, 24 (2013) (“Those in the e-discovery world have begun
to grasp the implications of big data, but most other lawyers have not.”).
63. 2016 ILTA/InsideLegal Technology Purchasing Survey, INT’L LEGAL TECH.
ASS’N,
5
(2017),
https://insidelegal.typepad.com/files/2016_ILTA_
InsideLegal_Technology_Purchasing_Survey.pdf.
64. Id. at 3.
65. Jobst Elster, Big Data for Law Firms, LEGAL MGMT. 36 (2013),
http://insidelegal.typepad.com/files/2013/10/Big-Data-for-Law-Firms-JobstElster-ALA-Legal-Manageme nt.pdf.
66. See Nelson, supra note 62, at 25 (predicting that “clients will begin to use
data analytics to evaluate law firms in a far more precise fashion . . . .” and that
“comparisons between law firms will be much easier to make”).
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competition is charging, or guesswork. None of these are good
pricing strategies for a law firm. The firm that leads with analytics
can appropriately price work, even (or especially) disaggregated
work. While such firms may choose to price their offerings as lossleaders, the decisions are based on sound analysis, rather than
guesses or price-matching discounts.
Not only does data analysis help with sound pricing calculations,
it can be used, like disaggregation, in a marketing pitch. As Justin
Ergler, Director of Alternative Fee Intelligence and Analytics in
GlaxoSmithKline PLC’s legal department, said, “in order to survive
the new marketplace, law firms must differentiate themselves with
something other than the excellent lawyering mantra. Leveraging
big data is a way to do that.”67
Proving big data capabilities can help demonstrate three things
to clients. First, regarding the client’s billing and services received,
the firm can show it knows more about what the client spent and
what the client bought than the client does. Second, regarding
management of bundled services for the client, the firm shows it
understands the costs and benefits of the options and chooses the
most efficient deliverables management methods. And third,
regarding the client’s legal issues, the firm has the means to
understand and explain the complex data-driven facts that underlie
many of today’s legal problems.
D. Commoditized Legal Work
A commodity is a commercial good that is interchangeable with
goods of the same type from other sources.68 The quality difference
among the goods is slight, and the goods meet some minimum
standard.69 Commoditized legal work is work for which there is no
significant value to add; the quality of the product among various
providers is reasonably interchangeable.70 When work is
67. Jobst Elster, The Billable Hour’s Grip on Legal: Changing Times have Made the
Gold Standard in Legal Billing Less Viable—but it’s not Entirely Obsolete, LEGAL MGMT. 24
(2017), http://insidelegal.typepad.com/files/2017/Editorial/ALA%20Legal%20
Management_Feature_The%20Billable%20Hours%20Grip%20on%20Legal_201702.pdf.
68. Commodity, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/
commodity.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2017).
69. Id.
70. See Raymond H. Brescia, White Paper: What we Know and Need to Know About
Disruptive Innovation, 67 S. C. L. REV., 203, 211 (2016) (“Commoditization is the
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commoditized, clients can seek out the lowest price available because
the quality of the deliverable does not decrease with price.71 Firms
that can standardize and systematize certain components of legal
services are able to develop workflows which relocate timekeepers’
efforts, by reassigning the commoditized components to either
lower-priced timekeepers or workers whose time is not billed hourly.
The result is usually some combination of these two outcomes,
meaning that the firm must have both the ability to develop systems
and to employ effective workers whose time can be billed at lower
rates or at a flat rate. While these two resources sometimes appear
accidentally in a law firm, they may only come about intentionally as
the result of strategic planning.
Some of the commoditized work will be performed by clients
themselves; this work will never make it to a law firm.72 Some of the
work will be performed by a legal services provider which may never
make it to a law firm. And finally, some of the work will be moved
from one firm to a more efficient (i.e. cheaper) firm.73 The danger,
of course, is for a firm that has not developed efficiencies to attempt
to compete on price with a firm that has developed such efficiencies.
The opportunity is found in the alternative; firms can develop
efficiencies and compete on price to win work and to upsell
customizable work. The authors are not under any illusions when it
comes to the feasibility of and the effort required to develop
efficiencies. “[F]irms will need human, brand, technological, and
financial resources to deploy against new and increasingly complex
problems and to develop new intellectual property.”74 Developing
capabilities to provide commoditized legal services may have an

process by which a product or service becomes so commonplace that it can be
obtained from a variety of suppliers with virtually no easily determined difference
between those suppliers’ product, as with the case of milk, sugar, or gasoline.“).
71. One characteristic of commodities is fungibility–the individual units are
interchangeable. As Karl Marx wrote, “From the taste of wheat, it is not possible to
tell who produced it, a Russian serf, a French peasant or an English capitalist.” Cori
Hayden, Distinctively Similar: A Generic Problem, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV., 601, 601 (2013).
72. Susskind calls this in-sourcing: “[w]hen lawyers undertake legal work
themselves, using their own internal resources. This could be, for example, when
an in-house legal department decides to conduct all of its negotiation and drafting
internally, without any external advice or assistance.” Susskind, supra note 12, at 37.
73. See, e.g., Ahmed Murad, Virtual Legal Teams are Giving Clients a Cheaper, More
Efficient Option, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/8bb6 82fe39f9-11e4-83c4-00144feabdc0.
74. Christensen, Wang & van Bever, supra note 52, at 112.
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unexpected impact, and even strain, on a law partnership.75 As
services become commoditized, the knowledge and competencies
required to deliver those services becomes less proprietary to
individual lawyers.76 According to Laura Empson, “there is less need
to secure their cooperation by offering them a share of ownership
and a say in the management of the firm. In this context, the
limitations of a partnership start to outweigh its benefits.”77 This is a
pretty dramatic thing to say about partnerships, and while this
declaration is not a prediction of the demise of the law firm
partnership model, partnerships must adapt to commoditized work.
E. A Move Away from the Billable Hour
The move away from the billable hour should be no surprise.
You certainly did not read it here first. Yet the 2017 Report on the State
of the Legal Market (“2017 Report”) reports that this is “[o]ne of the
most potentially significant, though rarely acknowledged, changes of
the past decade . . . .”78 Clients who want efficiency and predictability
do not want to pay by the hour. Richard Susskind writes that
“[h]ourly billing is an institutionalized disincentive to efficiency. It
rewards lawyers who take longer to complete tasks than more
organized colleagues, and it penalizes legal advisers who operate
swiftly and efficiently.”79 Yet the billable hour is indisputably the
prevalent method for calculating legal fees. In fact, the billable hour
is so ubiquitous that any billing arrangement that does not rely on
billable hours falls into the category of alternative fee arrangement
(“AFA”).80 The 2017 Report argues that one popular approach, the
75. Laura Empson, Your Partnership: Surviving and Thriving in a Changing World:
The Special Nature of Partnership, in MANAGING THE MODERN LAW FIRM: NEW
CHALLENGES, NEW PERSPECTIVES 17 (Laura Empson ed., Oxford U. Press 2007).
76. Id.
77. Id. This prediction is based on agency theory. “The partnership form of
governance emphasizes informal practices of mutual- and self-monitoring, which
are backed up by unlimited personal liability. These will be more effective than
formalized managerial controls at minimizing free-riding and shirking.” Id. Agency
theory is discussed in the Leadership Section below, in the context of lawyers
preferring leaders who are partners. See infra Part III: Leadership.
78. GEO. L. & THOMSON REUTERS LEGAL EXEC. INST., PEER MONITOR, 2017
REPORT
ON
THE
STATE
OF
THE
LEGAL
MARKET
9
(2017),
http://static.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/static/pdf/peer-monitor/S04220
1-Final.pdf [hereinafter 2017 REPORT].
79. SUSSKIND, supra note 12, at 17.
80. Jerome Crawford & Erika L. Davis, Show Me The Bill, 96 MICH. B.J. 40, 40
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“budget with cap” model, is worse than an AFA (which the 2017
Report defines as fixed-cost or cost-plus) because firms have to work
their way up to the fixed price through already heavily discounted
billable hours.81 Even when calculating fees with no reference to
hours, law firms often use a proxy, by estimating how many billable
hours the work requires, and then proposing an alternative method
for collecting that amount of money.82
The ability to successfully move away from the billable hour
depends on a firm’s ability to disaggregate legal work to find the
lowest-rate biller (including identifying, and appropriately
outsourcing, commoditized legal work and other services);83 using
analytics to determine the costs of the various unbundled
components (requiring a historic practice of collecting critical
data);84 and re-aggregating the work to set a price for the client. In
this way, hours matter, but not billable hours. The hours that matter
are the hours used in the cost equation, which are the “actual hourly
costs (not billing rates) for all lawyers and other staff required to
deliver the anticipated services.”85 When combined with an
allocation of overhead, these costs can provide the basis for pricing
work and for evaluating past projects to compare estimated costs to
actual costs.
The billable hour is so pervasive in firm culture that, even when
evaluating compensation models for attorneys and determining how
to reward non-billable work, firms often assign a billable-hourequivalent to certain efforts.86 For example, when accounting for
work such as client relations or professional development, firms can
provide billable hour credits or “firm investment time” to incentivize
lawyer participation.87 Most lawyers think of their value in terms of
how many hours they billed last year and the size of their book of

(2017) (“Alternative fee arrangements are a way for lawyers to receive compensation
without relying on hourly billing.”).
81. See 2017 REPORT, supra note 78, at 9–10.
82. See id.
83. See supra section II.B, D.
84. See supra section II.C.
85. 2016 REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
86. David C. Baca, The Managing Partner’s Perspective – Incentivizing the Right
Behavior, in COMPENSATION (RE)DESIGN FOR LAW FIRMS 53, 54 (Soo Darcy ed., 2016)
(discussing using billable hour as mode of “right behavior” measure).
87. Cf. id.
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business.88 Associates earn bonuses based on their billable hours.89
Firms persist in relying on the billable hour because it is an easy form
of measurement to understand. Yet, we know that lawyer practices
and expectations are complex and therefore law firms should
change compensation systems to address and reward a range of
behaviors.90
The opportunity to move beyond the billable hour is twofold.
First, by understanding the costs associated with work—either by
proactively developing cost-based models or by ex-post analysis of a
flat-fee billing arrangement—law firms will understand their own
business better.91 Second, by pricing work based on value, not on
hours, firms can create efficiencies that translate in to more profits.92
These opportunities solve what one commentator called the
technology paradox or billing dilemma.93 Ani Krikorian writes that
technologies such as online research and electronic discovery
databases enable “attorneys to work more efficiently, i.e., spending
less time on matters that used to take more hours to complete.”94
She then echoes Susskind’s observation when she writes that these
technologies “should result in a smaller bill, yet the practice of timebased billing seems to encourage and reward inefficiency.”95 Thus,
value-based billing enables an attorney to capture the value

88. See, e.g., Do you Measure Success by Inputs or Outputs?, BOREALE L. (Oct. 16,
2013), http://www.borealelaw.com/do-you-measure-success-by-inputs-or-outputs/.
89. See,
e.g.,
FREDRIKSON
&
BYRON
SALARY
OVERVIEW,
https://www.fredlaw.com/careers/attorneys__law_students/salary_ overview/ (last
visited Nov. 5, 2017) (“For example, a beginning associate who earns a base salary
of $120,000 will earn approximately $131,953 if the associate hits 1,900 creditable
hours.”).
90. See supra note 88.
91. David Lat, Beyond The Billable Hour: 6 Key Insights, ABOVE THE L. (April 30,
2015), https://abovethelaw.com/2015/04/beyond-the-billable-hour-6-keyinsights/
(“[N]ot all clients and matters are worth pursuing. Firms must give careful thought
to the type of work they want and how to get that work.”).
92. Id. (“Stacey Kielbasa of Chapman and Cutler focused her remarks on the
implications that the move away from the billable hour has for attorney recruitment
and training. Chapman has reduced its focus on the billable hour and shifted its
focus to efficiency. The firm wants to track and reward behaviors that drive client
value, not just the racking up of hours.”).
93. Ani Krikorian, Billing Outside the Box, 27 GEO. J. L. ETHICS 27 655, 663
(2014).
94. Id.
95. Id.; see also SUSSKIND, supra note 12, at 17.
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generated by technical innovation.96 This “strategy of ‘market-valued
pricing’ [applies] traditional business product pricing tools” and is
a “profit-, not revenue-, based business model.”97
F. Nonlawyers are Getting Into the Business of Providing Legal Services
Rule 5.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits
nonlawyer ownership of law firms.98 The ABA refers to “business
models through which legal services are delivered in ways that are
currently prohibited by Model Rule 5.4” as alternative business
structures (“ABS”).99 In addition to ABS, the discussion of nonlawyer
ownership also refers to Multidisciplinary Practice (MDP), which
describes a scenario where lawyers “share their fees with nonlawyers,
and practice law in institutions that are partially or wholly owned by
nonlawyers.”100 The vast majority of states follow Rule 5.4 or have a
similar rule.
A case from the Southern District of New York challenging such
a rule provides a good introduction to why states regulate attorney
behavior in this way.101 The law firm of Jacoby & Meyers challenged
New York state’s Rule 5.4 of Professional Conduct and a dozen state
laws prohibiting lawyers from partnering or sharing legal fees with
nonlawyers.102 The challenge was based on allegations of First
Amendment violations (both free speech and freedom of
association), Fourteenth Amendment violations (both substantive
due process and equal protection), and violations of the dormant
96. Peggy K. Hall, I’ve Looked at Fees from Both Sides Now: A Perspective on MarketValued Pricing for Legal Services, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 154, 157 (2012) (suggesting
that law firms reframe what they are selling: “It may be semantics, but focusing on
market pricing conceptually allows the notion that a market price might not
necessarily be lower than a price derived by hourly billing models. Rather than a
firm’s ‘inventory’ only being the hours it has to sell, a firm should think of its
inventory as the ‘value’ it has to sell, which should be priced at the market rate for
that value.”).
97. Id. at 157–58.
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (A.B.A. 1983).
99. A.B.A. Comm’n on The Future of Legal Serv., For Comment: Issue Paper
Regarding Alternative Business Structures (2016).
100. Va. St. B. & Va. St. B. Ass’n Joint Comm’n on Multidisciplinary Prac.,
Understanding the Debate Over Multidisciplinary Practice (MDP), VA. LAW. MAG., 35, 35
(2001), http://www.vsb.org/docs/valawyermagazine/dec01mdp.pdf.
101. See Jacoby & Meyers v. Presiding Justices of the First, Second, Third &
Fourth Dep’ts, 118 F. Supp. 3d 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
102. Id. at 554.
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Commerce Clause.103 There was also an underlying non-legal
argument related to access-to-justice issues; namely, that capital
investment from nonlawyers would help firms provide legal services
to underrepresented groups.104
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ultimately affirmed
the district court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to dismiss.105 The
district court found that no violation of any constitutional right
existed because the regulations satisfied the strict scrutiny
requirement for a legitimate state interest.106 The Second Circuit
found that the regulations and laws “serve New York State’s wellestablished interest in regulating attorney conduct and in
maintaining ethical behavior and independence among the
members of the legal profession” by precluding “the creation of
incentives for attorneys to violate ethical norms, such as those
requiring attorneys to put their clients’ interests foremost.”107 The
district court provided additional reasons for the restrictions, such
as protecting the public by “preventing nonlawyers from controlling
how lawyers practice law and . . . attempt[ing] to minimize the
number of situations in which lawyers will be motivated by economic
incentives rather than by their client’s best interests.”108 Because
other international jurisdictions have moved forwards, is there
something special about lawyers in the United States that makes
them especially vulnerable to outside influence?
There are two jurisdictions that deviate from the general
prohibition against ABSs in the United States: the District of
Columbia and Washington state. District of Columbia Rule 5.4(b)
permits ABSs “in which a financial interest is held or managerial
authority is exercised by an individual non-lawyer who performs
professional services which assist the organization in providing legal
services to clients,” subject to certain conditions and restrictions.109
As mentioned above, Washington state permits nonlawyers to
provide legal advice in the role of a Limited License Legal

103. Id. at 560.
104. Id. at 575–76.
105. Jacoby & Meyers v. Presiding Justices of the First, Second, Third & Fourth
Dep’ts, N.Y. App. Div., 852 F.3d 178, 182 (2d Cir. 2017).
106. Id. at 178.
107. Id. at 191.
108. Jacoby & Meyers, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 574 (quoting Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass’n,
956 F.2d 1378, 1385 (7th Cir. 1992) (internal quotations omitted)).
109. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(b) (D.C. BAR ASS’N, amended 2007).
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Technician (“LLLT”).110 In early 2015, the Washington Supreme
Court added a rule to the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct
that permits ABSs involving, inter alia, ownership and fee-sharing
among lawyers and LLLTs.111 Additionally, the ABA Commission on
the Future of Legal Services took note of a New York State Bar
Association Committee on Professional Ethics’ opinion that allowed
a New York attorney to “enter into a partnership with a Japanese
benrishi—a professional licensed to practice intellectual property
law in Japan who need not have a law school degree.”112 Outside of
the United States, a number of jurisdictions allow for ABSs in some
form. For example, Australia, England, Wales, Scotland, Italy,
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Belgium,
Canada (Quebec and British Columbia), Singapore, and New
Zealand all permit some form of nonlawyer ownership.113
The ABA has recently moved from its previous position of
resistance to its current position of considering, even encouraging,
the possibility of ABSs. In 2011, the ABA Commission on Ethics
20/20 (“20/20 Commission”) “publicly rejected certain forms of
nonlawyer ownership that some other countries currently permit,
including multidisciplinary practices, publicly traded law firms, and
passive, outside nonlawyer investment or ownership in law firms.”114
In 2012, the 20/20 Commission released a statement summarizing
further research and consultation into ABS, declaring that “there
does not appear to be a sufficient basis for recommending a change
to ABA policy on non-lawyer ownership of law firms.”115 But in
August 2014, the ABA formed the Commission on the Future of
Legal Services (“Future Commission”) to take up the issue again with
the charge to “improve the delivery of, and access to, legal services
in the United States.”116 The Future Commission proposed, and in
February 2016, the ABA House of Delegates approved, Resolution
105, which provided guidance to state supreme courts and bar
110. Legal Technicians, supra note 27.
111. WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.9 (WASH. BAR ASS’N, adopted 2015).
112. A.B.A. Comm’n on the Future of Legal Servs., Report on the Future of Legal
Servs. in the United States 4 (2016).
113. Id. at 5–6.
114. A.B.A. Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Will Not Propose Changes to ABA Policy
Prohibiting Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms, (April 16, 2012).
115. Id.
116. A.B.A. Comm’n on the Future of Legal Servs., supra note 112, at 5–6,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/2016mymres/
105.pdf.
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associations as they examine their regulatory framework concerning
non-legal service providers.117 Before the vote, the opposing sides
debated two amendments that summarized the sentiments of the two
sides. The first amendment passed, adding this language to the
resolution: “[N]othing contained in this Resolution abrogates in any
manner existing ABA policy prohibiting non lawyer ownership of law
firms or the core values adopted by the House of Delegates.”118 The
second amendment failed; it tried to “require lawyer supervision of
non-lawyers providing legal services; require that such practitioners
be subject to rules of professional conduct; and require that such
practitioners accurately state the scope of services provided.”119
The ABA has stopped short of encouraging states to authorize
ABSs, but also has resisted pressure to recommend additional
regulation of nonlawyer practitioners. Sam Glover of the Lawyerist
summarized the state of affairs as thus: “[A]ll the controversial
provision does is acknowledge reality. But if any state regulators were
waiting for a cautious go-ahead from the ABA, now they have it.”120
In April 2016, the Future Commission issued a paper calling for
comments regarding ABSs.121 In August 2016, the Future
Commission published its report, finding, inter alia, that “[n]ew
providers of legal services are proliferating and creating additional
choices for consumers and lawyers,”122 and that “[t]he traditional law
practice business model constrains innovations that would provide
greater access to, and enhance the delivery of, legal services.”123 The
Future Commission recommended that courts “consider regulatory
innovations in the area of legal services delivery,” specifically
through “continued exploration” of ABSs and by developing and

117. A.B.A., Resolution 105 Revised & Amended (Feb. 2016), https://www.Ame
ricanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/abanews/2016mymres/105.pdf.).
118. Lorelei Laird, ABA House Approves Model Regulatory Objectives for
Nontraditional
Legal
Services,
A.B.A.J. (Feb.
8,
2016,
5:55
PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/house_approves_proposed_model_reg
ulatory_objectives_for_nontraditional_lega.
119. Id.
120. Sam Glover, ABA Opens the Door to “Non-Traditional Legal Service Providers,”
LAWYERIST (Feb. 9, 2016), https://lawyerist.com/aba-opens-the-door-to-Nontrad
itional-legal-service-providers/.
121. A.B.A. Comm’n on the Future of Legal Servs., supra note 112, at 5–6.
122. Id. at 5.
123. Id. at 16. Recall that access to justice was one of Jacoby and Meyers’
arguments, supra note 101.
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assessing evidence and data regarding the risks and benefits
associated with ABSs in jurisdictions where ABSs are allowed.124
A few opportunities exist here for law firms, along with a few
warnings. The first opportunity is to take a stand. Law firms can
figure out how they want to react when these changes come to their
jurisdictions. They can plan to be on the side of liberalization and
encourage ABSs, or they can hunker down with the opposition.
Another opportunity is preparation. Law firms that wish to seek
outside investment can start to make changes now to position
themselves as attractive investments. Consider the following warning
from The Economist, answering the question, “Should you buy shares
in a law firm?”:
Another concern for potential investors is that lawyers are
not proven business leaders. Clients frustrated with privatepractice lawyers often accuse them of lacking commercial
nous. Because most lawyers spend much of their time
peering at small print, big-picture concerns can go
unnoticed. Few managing partners know their firm’s profit
per billable hour, even though that is the main product law
firms sell. Cost control is often an afterthought, trailing far
behind revenue generation.125
The author continues by advising law firms that, to be attractive
to investors, the firm’s managers must be able to run the firm like a
public company. Specifically, outside investors will “be less
sentimental and more critical” than equity partners when analyzing
performance.126 As discussed below, law firms have an opportunity
to place professional nonlawyer directors in key managerial
positions.127
G. Changing Demographics of the Workforce
Current research and writing about demographics of law firms
use classes such as age and generation (e.g., baby boomer and
generation X) to categorize lawyers’ roles, goals, beliefs, and
attitudes within law firms.128 While the categories neatly describe the
124. Id. at 37–42.
125. Legal Advice: Should You Buy Shares in a Law Firm?, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 21,
2008), http://www.economist.com/node/11967043.
126. Id.
127. Infra Part IV.
128. See, e.g., MP McQueen, Here Come the Big Law Millennials, THE AM. LAW. (Feb.
29, 2016), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/almID/1202749825654.
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lawyer workforce, age is merely a proxy for understanding that older
lawyers have been in the profession longer, have been with the firm
longer, are closer to retirement, are more likely to be in positions of
leadership, and own more client relationships than younger lawyers.
While these statements are truisms for many lawyers, we present
them here in black and white to contrast them with most of the
corporate world.129 Understanding how the nonlawyer world works
is important because, as we have attempted to show above,
nonlawyers will soon compete with law firms.130 The current
ownership, pay, and business structures of most law firms are not
well-suited to compete with corporations. It is not the older lawyers’
fault that they rose through the ranks and succeeded in the
prevailing law firm structure. Additionally, it is not their fault that
changes loom on the eve of their retirement. However, the reality is
that many older lawyers are practicing on the cusp of disaster.
Millennials have taken over as the largest generation in the
United States,131 and they think and act differently than previous
generations. Gallup recently published a report summarizing these
differences, noting that millennials are more concerned with their
“purpose” and their “life” than they are with their “paycheck” and
their “job” (respectively).132 The majority of millennials are not
engaged in their work, meaning that their “employers are not giving
them compelling reasons to stay.”133 In fact, lack of loyalty to
employers is a recurring hallmark of the millennial generation.134
But it has been noted that if employers can keep their millennials
129. See Elizabeth Olson, Graying Firms Wrestle With Making Room for Younger
Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/
Business/dealbook/graying-firms-wrestle-with-making-room-for-younger-lawyers.ht
ml?mcubz=3 (“Less than 5 percent of managing partners or their equivalents in the
top 100 firms were born [in] . . . the Generation X period. In comparison, almost
20 percent of Fortune 100 corporations and 30 percent of companies traded on the
Nasdaq stock market have leaders in that generation . . . .”).
130. See supra Part II(f): Non-Lawyers are Getting into the Business of Providing
Legal Services; see Glover, supra note 120.
131. See Richard Fry, Millennials Overtake Baby Boomers as America’s Largest
Generation, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/04/25/millennials-overtake-baby-boomers/.
132. How Millennials Want to Work and Live, GALLUP NEWS (2016),
http://news.gallup.com/reports/189830/e.aspx#aspnetForm.
133. Id. at 6.
134. See James Weber, Discovering the Millennials’ Personal Values Orientation: A
Comparison to Two Managerial Populations. 143 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICS, 517, 519
(2017).
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engaged, “they will be happy to overachieve for you.”135 These
millennials are the next generation, and law firms must
accommodate their different personal value orientation into futureplanning.136
William Henderson, a professor at the Indiana University
Maurer School of Law, has warned that “[s]ome law firms could
crumble” if they do not figure out how to shift ownership and power
to a younger generation.137 Others have written that failure to design
succession plans creates the perilous situation involving anxious
clients that, wary of counsel’s lack of transition plans, choose to work
with another firm, rather than risk the unexpected retirement of
current counsel.138 This article is not intended to serve as a flagwaving, flare-launching warning of a looming disaster, but some
commentators warn of firms losing clients when partners retire.139
The authors hope that this article establishes that partner retirement
is just one of many vectors for losing clients. In other words, if a firm
is concerned that a client will leave when a partner retires, that firm
is already not doing enough to retain that client.
The problem with aging lawyer leadership is the prevalence of
short-term thinking among decision makers. If forty percent of
practicing lawyers are approaching retirement, it is hard to expect
them to be motivated by long-term profits.140 Accordingly, not only
are these lawyers with the big clients a concern for law firms in this
changing market, older lawyers are also more likely to impede the
changes that law firms must make to survive. In the majority of law
firms, lawyers sixty years old or older control more than twenty-five
135. Id.
136. See id. at 524–28 (discussing values orientation, the Rokeach Value Survey,
and their implications for managing millennials).
137. Id.
138. Bill Donahue, Firms Ignore Aging Partners at Their Own Peril, LAW360 (June
28, 2013), https://www.law360.com/articles/447809/firms-ignore-aging-partnersat-their-own-peril.
139. Id.
140. See ALAN R. OLSON, LAW FIRM SUCCESSION PLANNING: DO ONE SIMPLE THING
1 (Altman Weil, Inc., 2012), http://www.de-lap.org/pdfs/2c2d6f51-66c8-4c2db420-2da0a8003b17_document.pdf (“30%-40% of actively practicing lawyers are at
an age and stage where they are beginning to retire, phase down, or contemplate
phasing down.”); see also Eric A. Seeger & Thomas S. Clay, 2016 Law Firms in
Transition,
ALTMAN
WEIL
FLASH
SURVEY
20
(2016),
http://www.altmanweil.com/dir_docs/resource/95e9df8e-9551-49da-9e25-2cd868
319447_document.pdf (showing willingness to make long-term investments
inversely proportional to proximity to retirement).
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percent of the revenue.141 This alone buys a lot of influence.
Additionally, many of these lawyers are in positions of top leadership,
as lawyers born between 1946 and 1955 make up almost half of the
managing partner seats in the top 100 law firms.142
H. Third-party Financing
Third-party financing refers to someone other than the party or
the party’s lawyer paying the costs of litigation.143 This financing is
different from recourse loans to lawyers, which are loans that must
be paid regardless of successful outcomes.144 Third-party financiers
usually only get paid if the litigation is successful; if the litigation is
unsuccessful, the party and the lawyers typically owe the financer
nothing.145 But the party and the lawyers do not get a free ride, as
most funders require the lawyer and the party to maintain enough
interest in the action to remain motivated in pursuing a positive
outcome for the investor.146
Third-party financing is a result of, and is facilitated by, the
changes discussed in this article. First, for law firms unwilling (or
unable because of cash flow) to take on the risks associated with
alternative fees, the third-party provides the financing to both
mitigate the risk and pay the bills.147 However, the law firm must be
very good at budgeting because investors require detailed cost
141. See Seeger & Clay, supra note 140, at 34.
142. Cf. ALAN OLSON, supra note 140 (stating that less than 5% of managing
partners were born between 1960 and 1980). The actual statistic is 3% of managing
partners were born between 1965 and 1982, the so-called generation X. Id.
143. Radek Goral, Skin in the Game: Why Business Lawsuits Get Third-party Funded,
30 NOTRE DAME J. OF L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 247, 248 (2016) (providing the
following examples: “buying a stake in a patent asserted against an infringer,
lending against expected proceeds from a pending suit, or paying the costs of
litigation in exchange for a portion of anything recovered”).
144. See Radek Goral, The Law of Interest Versus the Interest of Law, or on Lending to
Law Firms, 29 GEO. J. OF LEGAL ETHICS 253, 303 (2016) (discussing specialized lawfirm financiers who are “paid from the cash flow of a borrowing litigator”).
145. See A.B.A. Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the House of
Delegates 4–7 (2012), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/adm
inistrative/ethics_2020/20111212_ethics_20_20_alf_white_paper_final_hod_infor
mational_report.authcheckdam.pdf.
146. See Goral, supra note 143, at 272 n.55 (“The skin-in-the-game motive is
probably the single, most prominent theme present in all interviews where
incentives in litigation funding arrangements were discussed. The expression itself
was used by interviewees surprisingly often and without being prompted.”).
147. See id.
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estimates.148 After all, this is the price the firm pays for the
investment. These fee estimates often are not based on hourly
billing, but instead, on flat fees.149 And once a firm agrees to deliver
services for a fixed price, it is in the firm’s interest to provide those
services as efficiently as possible. Second, ethics rules and various
state regulations currently prohibit the expansion of third-party
investment. We have seen how Model Rule 5.4 prohibits fee-splitting
with nonlawyers.150 But as states loosen these rules, firms will be able
to enter into fee-splitting arrangements with nonlawyers. Third, law
firms that want their matters backed by third-party financing will
need to excel at selling themselves as viable investment candidates.
A firm will benefit from having data analytics capabilities, not only to
crunch the numbers, but to visualize the results in a way that is
attractive to investors.151 Naturally, marketing and presentation skills
will help. Firms should create marketing and presentation
deliverables quickly, because their creation is not billable work. Last,
an investor may agree to pay the firm for some legal services, but not
for others. For example, the investor may mandate that document
review is handled by a certain company, perhaps one in which the
investor has a stake. Because the investor is now forcing the firm to

148. Guide to Litigation Financing, WESTFLEET ADVISORS 10 (2015), https://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2015_sp
ring_leadership_meeting/guide_to_litigation_financing_may_2014_charles_agee.
authcheckdam.pdf (“To consummate a litigation financing transaction, a company
needs to prepare the appropriate documents, develop a targeted list of financing
providers, schedule meetings with providers, and negotiate term sheets and
financing documents. Companies should begin the process by assembling a synopsis
of the financing opportunity it intends to offer. This synopsis should include a
detailed memorandum discussing the legal claim (including strengths of the
opposing party’s position and how these will be refuted), financial projections for
the budget and probable outcome(s), and a due diligence package (including legal
and factual analyses, material documents and pleadings, expert reports, CVs and
relevant experience of litigation counsel, parameters of engagement with counsel,
et cetera).”).
149. See Roy Strom, A New Game of Risk, CHICAGO LAW. (Aug. 2014),
http://chicagolawyermagazine.com/Archives/2014/08/Longford-Capital
(explaining how Longford Capital, a litigation funding firm, does not pay lawyers
using only the billable hour).
150. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (A.B.A. 1983).
151. For example, big data companies like Juristat offer tools to law firms that
allows firms to compare their performance metrics with those of other firms to
highlight where they excel to investors. See JURISTAT, https://www.juristat.com/#bus
inessintelligence (lastvisited Nov. 7, 2017).
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disaggregate, a firm accustomed to managing (or mismanaging,
which is too often the case) the entire matter may encounter a lot of
waste and administrative friction. These inefficiencies may cost
money which cannot be recovered because of the aforementioned
agreed-upon budgets.
It is one thing for the investment firm to exert pressure on the
law firm’s operation and how legal services are delivered, but what
about the investor that wants to influence the actual legal strategy?
It may be that an investor, unhappy with a law firm hired to deliver
the return on the investment (e.g., through legal victory), starts its
own law firm to handle the representation. One New York based
third-party investor has come full-circle and formed its own law firm,
Burford Law, in the United Kingdom.152 The ABS is headed by a
London-based solicitor with the purported goal of allowing “its
judgement enforcement team a new level of efficiency and ease with
which to fulfill client needs.”153 Said bluntly, a third-party financer
started its own law firm.154
It is not just obstacles such as Rule 5.4’s prohibition against fee
sharing and state champerty155 laws that will govern the success of
third-party funding in the United States.156 Michael McDonald,
assistant professor of finance at Fairfield University in Connecticut,
stated that the litigation funding industry needs to attract more
institutional interest. He writes:
Lawyers and financial analysts are both smart groups of
folks who have value, but they think about the world in
completely different ways. And most major institutional
152. Kali Hays, Burford Capital Launches Legal Arm To Enforce Judgments, LAW360
(Oct. 6, 2016, 1:22 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/848469/burford-capitallaunches-legal-arm-to-enforce-judgments.
153. Id.
154. See Victoria Shannon Sahani, Reshaping Third-Party Funding, 91 TUL. L. REV.
405, 409 (2017) (“Chris Bogart, CEO of Buford, . . . ‘Buford has added the ability
to be a law firm . . . .’”).
155. “An agreement between an officious intermeddler in a lawsuit and a
litigant by which the intermeddler helps pursue the litigant’s claim as consideration
for receiving part of any judgment proceeds; specif. [sic], an agreement to divide
litigation proceeds between the owner of the litigated claim and a party unrelated
to the lawsuit who supports or helps enforce the claim.” Champerty, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
156. See Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding,
95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1286–1301 (Apr. 2011) (discussing champerty and proposing
a regulatory framework designed to enable the benefits of benefits of third-party
financing while minimizing the harms).
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investors are dominated by finance people, not attorneys.
Corporate finance verticals are the same way, of course.
This dichotomy – attorneys asking finance people for
investments and asset sales – explains why the litigation
funding industry has not attracted more institutional
interest yet.157
McDonald concludes that “finance and accounting people
speak a different language than attorneys, and until litigation
finance firms learn to operate in both worlds, they [attorneys in
charge of third-party funders] will be missing out on the true level
of growth potential in the field.”158 If these attorneys, who are in the
business of third-party finance, cannot speak the language of
investors, lawyers who have not considered any of the concepts are
much further behind.
These changes are to the legal industry what digital cameras
were to the film market. They are to law firms what the internet was
to the retail book industry. Law firms need to decide if they want to
be Kodak and Borders, or if they want to follow better examples.
These changes are not threats; they are opportunities. Law firms
need to reposition while continuing to serve clients using their
current services model. Apple is an example of a company that
repositioned its core business while actively investing in the new
growth business. Apple rethought how computers were used in the
internet age while developing portable devices and product lines
with the iPad and iTunes.159 Amazon is another example, as it
expanded its product offering to include things like streaming
media and groceries while also building the world’s largest cloud
services platform.160 Of course, both of these examples sell products,
while law firms are professional service providers. Accordingly, the
dynamic of change for law firms is even more complicated than
developing a new product for the market. Perhaps the biggest
takeaway from these stories of thriving-through-adapting is not
157. Michael McDonald, Lessons From the Burford-Gerchen Keller Deal: What Might
Have Motivated This Major Deal in the Litigation Financing Space?, ABOVE THE L. (Dec.
20, 2016, 6:28 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2016/12/lessons-from-the-burfordgerchen-keller-deal/?rf=1.
158. Id. McDonald writes that “(i)nstitutions want to talk about laddered
durations in case portfolios, cross-case outcome correlations, and quantitative
methods of case selection. These are the kinds of concepts that [are] completely
outside the wheelhouse of attorneys.” Id.
159. Anthony & Schwartz, supra note 18.
160. Id.
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ultimately about the product, but rather about the leadership
needed to adapt to a changing marketplace. If you know the Amazon
and Apple stories, you know about Jeff Bezos and Steve Jobs.161 Both
leaders drove change and disrupted their respective markets. True
change requires leadership and vision, but it also requires doers
willing to work together, while trying new things.
III. LEADERSHIP
The purpose of this article is to detail an approach to managing
change in response to market dynamics; namely, that law firms’
lawyer leaders should partner with an operations team to execute law
firm strategies. Law firm leaders should also expect the operations
team to offer creative and new ways of doing business. This begs the
question: who develops the strategies? There are numerous ways to
structure leadership and management in a law firm. It is worth taking
some space to set the stage by discussing leadership and how to run
a law firm that is future-ready. In recent decades, many large law
firms have moved away from having an active, practicing attorney
managing the entire firm, and have started to move to various
models where leaders “resemble public-company CEOs, focused on
managing others at the firm,”162 particularly the partnership itself.
Ten years ago, one study found that:
During the last decade, larger law firms have begun
migrating to a more centralized corporate model for
managing certain business functions, such as accounting,
marketing, human resources, training and development—
freeing lawyers to focus on what they do best in the interest
of the client and the profession. Many midsized and
smaller firms are now following suit.163
161. See Tyler Durden, The Extraordinary Size of Amazon in One Chart, ZEROHEDGE
(Jan. 10, 2017, 1:51 PM), http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-01-09/Extraord
inary-size-amazon-one-chart (stating Jeff Bezos is the founder and CEO of Amazon,
the largest retailer in the United States (measured by market capitalization)); see
also Walter Isaacson, The Real Leadership Lessons of Steve Jobs, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr.
2012), http://www.harvardbusiness.org/real-leadership-lessons-steve-jobs (stating
Steve Jobs was the founder and CEO of Apple, who “cofounded Apple in his parents’
garage in 1976, was ousted in 1985, returned to rescue it from near bankruptcy in
1997, and by the time he died, in October 2011, had built it into the world’s most
valuable company”).
162. Nathan Koppel, Theory & Practice: Law Firms Try New Idea: Manager-Focused
CEO, WALL ST. J. B3 (Jan. 22, 2007).
163. See Roland B. Smith & Paul Bennett Marrow, The Changing Nature of
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This model is different from the “traditional management
model for U.S. law firms, [which] includes an ever-narrowing group
of partners managing high-level firm administration.”164
Alternative management models can be structured in many
ways, but one typical approach is to have a managing partner and a
chief operating officer (COO)165 work together to lead the firm. The
managing partner provides leadership and direction to the legal
practice and overall firm strategy, serving as a sounding board and
guide for the partnership.166 The managing partner must set
direction, build commitment, and ensure execution while constantly
exhibiting a personal example for all to see.167 The COO is often
someone with a business background, law firm operational
background, or a lawyer with significant law firm operational
experience.168 Operational experience and the requisite skillset
requires capabilities very different than those required for practicing
law or leading as a practitioner. “Giving direction at the operational

Leadership in Law Firms, 80 N.Y. ST. B. J. 33, 34 (Sept. 2008), http://myccl.ccl.org/Le
adership/pdf/landing/ChangingNatureLeadershipLawFirms.pdf; see also Elizabeth
Chambliss, New Sources of Managerial Authority in Large Law Firms, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 63, 67 (2009). This change has been observed for twenty years and supports
Elizabeth Chambliss’ finding that “(m)uch of the academic literature about the
basis of managerial authority in large law firms is grounded in market and
regulatory conditions circa 1980, such as relative firm stability, passive liability
insurers, and the absence of competing organizational forms. Likewise, much of the
ideological resistance to dedicated, professional management comes from a
generation of partners who are about to retire. Conditions have changed, with
profound effects on the structure, if not yet the culture, of law firm management.”
Id.
164. Lauren Moak & Nicholas Gaffney, Managing Partner or Executive Director?: A
New Model for Law Firm Management, L. PRAC. TODAY (June 2011), https://www.ameri
canbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/law_practice_today/managing_partn
er_or_executive_director.pdf.
165. “Executive Director” and “COO” can be used interchangeably, as the role
is the same.
166. THOMAS J. DELONG, JOHN J. GABARRO, & ROBERT J. LEES, WHEN
PROFESSIONALS HAVE TO LEAD 17 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Press 2007) (identifying the
integrated leader model).
167. Id. at 17.
168. In such situations, the title might be Chief Operating Partner (COP). A
firm should consider whether the COP has requisite leadership and operations
experience. Some firms may also divvy up some of the managing partner
responsibilities among more than one partner, in the form of an executive
committee, or a Strategic Chair. All of these partners require leadership skills. See
supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.
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level involves setting expectations and providing direction on a dayto-day, project-by-project basis. It consists of translating what the
firm’s or the practice’s strategy means in terms of choices, decisions,
and actions that are made in serving clients.”169 The success
ingredients to this managing partner/COO leadership partnership
are:
(1) The managing partner has credibility with her partners
and
exhibits strong “integrated” leadership skills;170
(2) The COO has strong operational and people leadership
skills;171
(3) Both leaders have influence with lawyers and operations
team members and work to create collaboration among all
within the firm;172 and
(4) Both leaders have a deep understanding of the ways to
influence and drive change in a law firm setting and work
together to do so.173
“The goal is to free managing partners to focus on revenuegenerating work,” be it through their own practice, or through
driving revenue-generating strategies and behaviors within the
firm.174 The managing partner must have a leadership skillset as it is
her job to “create a vision for the future, design a competitive
strategy, build an agile, flexible and inclusive culture, and attract,
retain and develop a top-flight, committed talent pool.”175 The result
is a “Managing Partner [who] provides the strategic leadership and
direction for the firm” and an “Executive Director or [COO] [who]
implements a multitude of tactics and coordinates the administrative
functions required to ensure the smooth day-to-day operation of the
firm.”176
169. DELONG ET AL., supra note 166, at 18.
170. See generally David Edelman, et al., The CMO and COO: Partners on a Customer
Journey,
MCKINSEY
&
COMPANY
MARKETING
&
SALES
(2015),
http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/marketing-and-sales/ourinsights/
the-cmo-and-coo-partners-on-a-customer-journey.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Lauren Moak & Nicholas Gaffney, supra note 164.
175. Smith & Marrow, supra note 163, at 34 (“Unlike administrative operations
such as finance and human resources, these core leadership responsibilities simply
cannot be delegated to non-attorney staff members.”).
176. Id. at 1 (quoting Glen Callison, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of
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This article presents the view that a managing partner paired
with a COO create the ideal leadership partnership to prepare for
and lead through market changes, since operations professionals are
the management agents of change. However, lawyers in law firms
may push back on the idea. For many lawyer-leaders, their
“credibility [as a leader] depends on [their] credibility as a
practitioner.”177 David Wilkins, Faculty Director of the Center on the
Legal Profession at Harvard Law School, says that “lawyer-managers
‘do have more authority because their partners see them as true
participants,’” but adds that “most big firms need a full-time
manager.”178
One structural problem that is characteristic of law firms and
has impeded moving to a COO model is the tension that exists
between the dominant rainmakers179 and full-time management:
Despite the tremendous potential for gain . . . the current
arrangement of power in large American law firms poses a
significant barrier preventing an extensive, dramatic, and
immediate shift in the management structure of the legal
profession. More specifically, a structural conflict exists
between the interests of the firm and those of the
rainmaking partners, at least in part because the dominant
rainmakers are both mobile and the most powerful actors
within law firms, and for the new model to be successful,
these partners must surrender a significant amount of
control. Further, the new model requires that power shift
from rainmaking partners to a centralized leader, making
this shift unlikely to occur because dominant partners will
not easily relinquish the authority and influence they
currently possess. Consequently, those attempting to
modify a firm’s management structure and the distribution
of power have the arduous task of garnering the approval
of the firm’s rainmakers since those lawyers are in a
position to thwart any proposed transformation.180
Munsch Hardt Kopf & Harr, P.C. from 2006–2013 (internal quotations omitted)).
177. Koppel, supra note 162, at 2 (quoting Evan Chesler, Chairman of Cravath,
Swaine & Moore LLP).
178. Id.
179. “[A] person (such as a partner in a law firm) who brings in new business.”
Rainmaker, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
Dictionary/rainmaker.
180. Matthew S. Winings, The Power of Law Firm Partnership: Why Dominant
Rainmakers Will Impede the Immediate, Widespread Implementation of an Autocratic
Management Structure, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 165, 166 (2006).
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Said differently, “the traditional law firm hierarchy often stands
in the way of new ideas. Partners who wield the most power within
their firm are often the least likely to see any reason to change a
system that has benefited them.”181
One problem with resistance to full-time managers is that
lawyers are often bad managers; accordingly, moving a successful
lawyer into a leadership role is not always a good idea.182 This isn’t a
knock against lawyers; many professionals are bad managers because
the key success behaviors in the professional field do not always align
with strong people management. For example, Peter Sherer, a
professor at the Haskayne School of Business in Calgary, Canada,
says that “‘[t]he best engineer isn’t necessarily the best manager or
team leader.’ As these professionals climb the ladder, they have to
rely more on other people to help them and ‘that’s a different set of
skills.’”183 Lawyers and law firms especially experience this skill
deficit because the legal education system does not often provide
ample management and leadership training.184 But some law schools
are beginning to adapt their curriculum to address the clear need
for more leaders and managers in the profession.185
181. Roy Strom, Barnes & Thornburg’s Efficiency Push: A Change Management Story,
THE AM. L. DAILY (June 17, 2017).
182. See generally Deena Shanker, Why are Lawyers Such Terrible Managers?,
FORTUNE (Jan. 11, 2013), http://fortune.com/2013/01/11/why-are-lawyers-suchterrible-managers/ (quoting Peter Sherer, professor).
183. Id.; see also Alice M. Sapienza, From the Inside: Scientists’ Own Experience of Good
(and Bad) Management, 35 R&D MGMT. 473, 473–82 (Nov. 2005) (“[S]cientists admit
that they are not ready for one of the most difficult and consequential aspects of
their work—leading a group of people.”).
184. See David G. Delaney, The Leadership Opportunity for Law Schools, A.B.A. J.
(Sept. 29, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/
the_leadership_opportunity_for_law_schools.
185. See, e.g., Donald J. Polden, Symposium on Leadership Education for Lawyers and
Law Students, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 685, 685 (2012) (describing the symposium as
a “national conference for law schools, law firms, and professional educators
developing methods and programs to provide not only more, but improved
leadership education for law students and lawyers”); George T. Lewis & Douglas A.
Blaze, Training Leaders the Very Best Way We Can, 83 TENN. L. REV. 771, 771–95 (2016)
(describing leadership courses at various schools, e.g. “Leadership for Lawyers” at
Santa Clara, “Leadership for Lawyers” at Columbia, “Law, Leadership, and Social
Change” at Stanford, “Leadership and Team Management” at University of Virginia,
“Leadership and Law” at University of Minnesota, and “Leadership Effectiveness
and Development” at University of Chicago); Michael J. Madison, Leading New
Lawyers: Leadership and Legal Education, 83 TENN. L. REV. 751, 751–69 n.3 (2016)
(describing the leadership course he developed at the University of Pittsburgh and
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Additionally, even after practicing for years or decades, “[t]he
qualities that are valuable in building a successful law practice are
not necessarily those that make for an effective manager.”186
Traditionally, “[l]arge law firms…are run by individuals who
generally have had no management training, and whose skills as
lawyers do not necessarily meet the demands of leadership.”187 In
their book, Learning from Law Firm Leaders, Susan G. Manch and
Michelle C. Nash articulate the core competencies needed for all
leadership if they want to gain followers.188 These competencies are
(1) knowledge
and skill mastery, (2) openness to learning, (3)
effective communication/interpersonal style, (4) mentorship, and
(5) vision.189 This leadership model clearly articulates how the
professional expert (lawyer) can also exhibit the needed
competencies to lead. Developing competencies two through four
listed above is the key to leading.
Despite evidence that professional managers are capable of
managing their businesses, lawyers do not often choose that option.
An example can be found in a recent article for The American Lawyer
that observes the changing legal markets and proposes that “today’s
leaders [need] to bring more younger partners into leadership
roles.”190 The reasoning is that law firms “should change the
composition of their leadership teams to include many more
younger partners,” because they “need to have people with skin in
the game to tackle appropriately a firm’s long-term challenges.”191
The idea of “skin in the game” (in other words, an ownership
interest) is important to lawyers. For example, it was cited as the
reason that Baker & Hostletler dropped their non-equity partner
tier.192 Skin in the game is a method chosen by law firms to avoid the
also providing a summary list of practitioners and scholars who are calling for
leadership training for lawyers).
186. Regan & Heenan, supra note 47, at 2163.
187. Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers and Leadership, 20 PROF. LAW. 1, no. 3, 13
(2010).
188. SUSAN G. MANCH & MICHELLE C. NASH, LEARNING FROM LAW FIRM LEADERS
64–65 (A.B.A. Book Pub. 2012).
189. Id.
190. Hugh A. Simons, Are Law Firms Too Sophisticated for Their Own Good?, AM.
LAW. (July 12, 2017), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202792832469/AreLaw-Firms-Too-Sophisticated-for-Their-Own-Good.
191. Id.
192. 2016 REPORT, supra note 1 (quoting Susan Beck, Baker & Hostetler Votes to
Nix Nonequity Partner Tier, AM. LAW. (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.americanlawyer.
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principal-agent problem. The principal-agent problem describes the
differences in motivation and behavior between principals (law firm
partners) and their agents (operations directors).193 The so-called
“principal-agency” problem is summarized in the proposition that “if
not sufficiently monitored or . . . [incentivized], agents will be lazy
or irresponsible—or at least not entirely selfless in their
motivations.”194 In other words, lawyers want their leaders to be
fellow partners because partners can be trusted to act selflessly, to
put the firm’s needs first.
While the previous sentence was written with straight faces, the
authors hope readers recognize the absurdity of the argument that
skin in the game creates altruistic motivation.195 The authors also
hope that readers recognize that thousands of companies are
successfully run by agents (managers) who act in the best interest of
the business owners (public companies generally follow this model).
Companies are successful despite being led by non-owners because
agents’ propensity for opportunistic behavior can be mitigated by
implementing agency controls (mechanisms whereby the goals of
principals and agents are aligned). “[A]gency controls play a critical
role in reducing their opportunistic behaviors.”196 The two most
common agency controls are monitoring and bonding.197
“Monitoring involves observing the behaviour and/or the
performance of agents. Bonding refers to arrangements that
penalize agents for acting in ways that violate the interests of
com/id=1202737020721/Baker—Hostetler-Votes-to-Drop-Nonequity-PartnerTier).
193. See generally 2 MARC J. HOLLEY, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EDUCATION, ECONOMICS, &
FINANCE 544–45 (Dominic J. Brewer & Lawrence O. Picus eds., 2014) (presenting
four assumptions of the principal-agent model: “both principals and agents are
rational actors seeking to maximize their own utility,” “there is information
asymmetry between the principal and the agent when the agent has specialized skill
or knowledge that the principal lacks,” there is a “potential misalignment of goals
between principals and agents,” and “that principals can set contractual provisions
unilaterally”).
194. Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 266, 277 (1998).
195. See Winings, supra note 180; see also Strom, Barnes & Thornburg’s Efficiency
Push, supra note 181 (showing examples where partners act selfishly and not in the
firm’s interest).
196. Eric A. Fong & Henry L. Tosi Jr., Effort, Performance, and Conscientiousness:
An Agency Theory Perspective, 33 J. OF MGMT. 161, 162 (2007).
197. THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATION STUDIES 16 (Stewart R. Clegg et al.
eds., 2006).
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principals or reward them for achieving principals’ goals.”198 One
prevalent example of bonding is an incentive in the form of a salary
that is tied to organizational goals.199
In addition to the agency controls of monitoring and
incentivizing, the personality of the agent also impacts the individual
manager’s levels of effort and performance. For individual
managers, possessing the personality trait of conscientiousness from
among the five commonly accepted personality factors200 “exerts the
greatest empirical impact on individual performance.”201
“Conscientiousness refers to the extent to which someone is
achievement-oriented, dependable, persevering, hardworking, and
deliberate.”202 Conscientiousness stands out among the personality
traits “because the positive relationship between conscientiousness
and individual performance has been found across all job criteria
and across all occupational groups studied.”203 Thus, despite lawyer
ownership, operations leaders are often as invested in the outcome
of the business due to personality traits, as well as structural
dynamics. The lack of individual personal financial gain available to
operations team members based on their inability to control a book
of business may create an enterprise-driven motivation. Conversely,
a personal gain mindset sets the stage for strong leadership
benefiting the whole law firm. Said differently, employees want to do
a good job because they want to get a better job, and doing a good
job at their current job is one of the best ways to advance their
careers.
It is worthwhile to note that leadership and management are
not the same thing. Annemarie Neal and Karen Conway, the authors
of the book Leading From the Edge: Global Executives Share Strategies for
Success, quote Mark Zukerberg, the founder of Facebook, as saying:
“There are people who are really good managers, people who can
manage a big organization . . . And then there are people who are

198. Id.
199. See id.
200. 5 ROBERT R. MCCRAE ET AL., PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 66
(Howard A. Tennen et al. eds., 2d ed. 2013) (stating the five personality traits are
neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and
conscientiousness).
201. Fong & Tosi, supra note 196, at 165.
202. Id.
203. Id. (citing Michael K. Mount & Murray R. Barrick, Five Reasons Why the “Big
Five” Article Has Been Frequently Cited, 51 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 849 (1998)).

2018]

CHANGES IN THE LEGAL MARKETPLACE

75

very analytical or focused on strategy. Those two types don’t usually
tend to be in the same person.”204 Neal asserts that in order for law
firms to manage change, they must “understand there’s a discipline
called management, and it’s valuable, and you can’t just be
chaotic.”205
Change is already here and more is coming; law firms need to
change the way they traditionally operate. “The traditional
partnership model was designed for the practice of law, not the
delivery of legal services,” let alone the adaptation to a radically
changing marketplace.206 Firms that do not anticipate and
proactively address the market changes (firms where “operations
professionals are accorded second-class status”)207 are not going to
be ready, and will cease to exist. Firms where COOs feel “that their
position is not vested with sufficient influence of authority to
implement the methodologies that they have been hired to develop”
will struggle.208 What is required of firm leadership and management
is “not merely an organizational change but a fundamental shift in
methods, approach, alignment with clients, reward system, and
division of labor.”209
Traditional law firm management will likely initially resist nonpartner leadership. But traditional law firm management and the
pool of available leadership candidates exhibiting the requisite
competencies among partners are not sufficient for the
requirements of rigorous change management needed in today’s law
firm.210 We have detailed the changes happening in the
profession.211 However, it is one thing to articulate outside market
pressures. It is another thing entirely to help an organization to
successfully change, let alone a law firm. While other factors are
204. ANNMARIE NEAL WITH KAREN CONWAY, LEADING FROM THE EDGE: GLOBAL
EXECUTIVES SHARE STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS 57 (ASTD Press 2013).
205. Dorie Clark, Why Great Leaders Make Bad Managers - and That’s OK, FORBES,
(Jan. 10, 2013, 10:34 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dorieclark/2013/01/10/
why-great-leaders-make-bad-managers-and-thats-ok/ (quoting Annemarie Neal,
author).
206. Mark Cohen, Are Law Firms Becoming Obsolete?, FORBES, (June 12, 2017, 5:36
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/markcohen1/2017/06/12/are-law-firmsbecoming-obsolete.
207. Id.
208. Lauren Moak & Nicholas Gaffney, supra note 164.
209. Cohen, supra note 206.
210. See id.
211. Supra Part II.
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involved, creating change within a law firm requires, at the very core,
acceptance and trust by a significant number of lawyers.212 This is not
something that can happen on day one when a COO walks into a
firm. The COO must gain the trust and acceptance of lawyers well
before the change is needed. In particular, the COO must have a
strong and trusting work relationship with the managing partner.
Patrick McKenna notes that he has “witnessed numerous
instances where the leadership transition [to a new managing
partner] has either caused the firm’s chief operating officer (COO)
to seek alternative employment or to be forced out because of a
conflict of working styles.”213 McKenna notes that this “magnif[ies]
the sensitive nature of how closely these two, the firm leader and
their COO, must work together.”214 In addition, the COO must gain
the acceptance and trust of the operations team to also lead
successful change. One might naively state that this should be easy,
as the COO is the “boss” of the operations team. But the retention
of law firm operations professionals is historically high. Because
many such professionals are well-regarded or protected by
influential lawyers, leading the team may be challenging. Rarely does
it occur that a COO arrives and cleans house immediately upon
joining the firm, which is a dynamic often seen in corporations.215
With all the political nuance required, some might argue that
an operations team could self-lead, without a COO. Before reaching
this conclusion, the managing partner should consider whether the
team can provide both management and leadership to itself.
“[M]anagement involves those activities focused on getting things
organized to accomplish a particular job or mission in the near term,
while leadership involves setting the long-term strategic direction for
an organization and inspiring people to move in that direction.”216
It is highly unusual for an operations team to do these well, especially
for themselves.

212. See Winings, supra note 180, at 188–89 (2006) (discussing skepticism held
by lawyers for firm management).
213. Patrick J. McKenna, When a New Firm Leader Takes the Reins, in RISE OF THE
LEGAL COO 31 (Laura Slater ed., 2017).
214. Id.
215. See Robert W. Denney, The Evolution of the Professional Administrator, A.B.A.:
LAW PRAC. (April/May 2008), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/law_Pra
ctice_home/law_practice_archive/lpm_magazine_articles_v34_is3_pg35.html.
216. Larry R. Richard & James W. Jones, The Scholarship on Leadership, in
HILDEBRANDT HANDBOOK OF LAW FIRM MANAGEMENT 352 (2010).
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Trust is at the epicenter of leading change in a law firm. “Trust
can be built one hundred and one ways, through both small and
large actions.”217 Most significantly, “professionals must see
alignment between what leaders say and what they do.”218 This trust
building is central to the success of the COO. In many ways, trust is
more easily built with a COO than with a practicing lawyer because
the COO is not vying for clients, resources, or a portion of the
partnership net revenue. The team may see the COO as an outsider
to the practice, but may recognize the COO as an insider to the
business. Many factors add to the complex law firm change dynamic,
including the influence of the law firm rainmakers, the lawyer
leader’s vision and strategy, the lawyer’s personality, the fear of
destabilizing a firm due to too much change at any given moment,
the differences among practice groups, the differences across offices
and countries, long held lack of trust between some lawyers, and true
alliances between other lawyers. It sounds like a season of Game of
Thrones,219 and at times, it is.
As the authors will address in detail later in the article, a strong
leader is needed to skillfully, and with finesse, lead this group of
people through change. Successful law firms will see this complex
dynamic and understand they need help navigating the choppy
waters ahead. Successful law firms will choose to work side-by-side
with other professionals and will look to the leadership of a COO
and an operations team for the change needed within the
organization. Successful law firms will have high expectations for the
COO and operations team; therefore, the COO and team must be
up to the task.
IV. MEET THE OPERATIONS TEAM
The law firm operational model is not historically viewed as an
influential team, a change agent, or a partner in the business.220 The
traditional law firm business model often separates the individuals
and teams who keep the law firm business humming (Marketing and

217. DELONG ET AL., supra note 166, at 26.
218. Id. at 27.
219. Game of Thrones (HBO) (television show developed by David Benioff and
D.B. Weiss).
220. See William Josten & Ian Turvill, Reinventing the Law Firm Business Model, WIS.
LAW. 42, 43 (2016); Toby Brown, Accounting 101 for Lawyers or Too Late, You Lose?,
UTAH B. J. 8 (1999).
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Business Development, IT, Human Resources, Finance, Facilities,
Recruiting, Diversity & Inclusion, and eDiscovery) from the legal
teams. This model labels the former group of professionals
“nonlawyers,” even when some of these professionals have law
degrees and are licensed lawyers. It happens through workspace
separation (sometimes by floor, sometimes in different office
locations) and it happens through a general lack of understanding
and appreciation for the important roles everyone plays. The
physical, linguistic, and behavioral separations hinder these
professionals from optimizing their full potential and ultimately
impact a firm’s ability to proactively address the changing legal
market.
Many of the individuals leading these functional areas are
people with tenure in the firm, promotions from remaining with the
firm for many years, influence with key lawyers, and the ability to
continually learn and adapt on the job.221 This tenure allowed law
firms to keep overhead in check versus recruiting in the expensive
marketplace.222 These roles were often focused on the core required
services within the firm.223 It is not hard to argue that you need a
human resources staff to focus on the hiring and evaluation of the
firm’s employees, a finance team to handle your billing and
collections, a facilities person to ensure your space is welcoming and
impressive to clients (and equally welcoming and impressive to
lawyer talent), and an IT department to ensure your technology
needs are met. Additionally, many of these roles have evolved
significantly in the last decade. However, it is a much newer dynamic
to hire subject matter experts with leadership competencies from
other professional service environments, corporations, or
competitive law firms to lead these functions.
Due to firms’ compensation, retirement plan structure, and the
revenue growth seen in the 1990s–2007 timeframe, key operations
professionals often stayed in their firms and were promoted to everincreasing responsibility.224 These professionals stayed because their
roles, responsibilities, and work evolved.225 Many stayed because they
221. See generally Marc Galanter, “Old and in the Way”: The Coming Demographic
Transformation of the Legal Profession and Its Implications for the Provision of Legal Services,
WIS. L. REV. 1081, 1092 (1999).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See id. at 1094.
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developed autonomy due to the divide between legal practices and
operations.226 It also became part of some firms’ retention strategies
to pay these individuals well to retain them.227 This practice is
commonly referred to in the industry as “combat pay” for people
willing and able to successfully work with lawyers. During this
timeframe, the legal profession also saw the emergence of the law
firm recruiter and law firm professional development manager as the
war for associate talent escalated, associate salaries dramatically
increased, and the time needed to lead successful recruiting and
retention efforts also increased.228 These market dynamics led lawyer
leadership to conclude that the daily operations of these functions
were better served by a subject matter professional instead of a
billing timekeeper.229 However, just as the marketing professional
worked with the marketing partner, the legal recruiting professional
worked closely with the firm’s hiring partner.230 These roles quickly
grew in influence as these professionals often worked closely with law
firm leadership and held the key to working with the talent most
needed in a law firm: associates.231 Recruiters and professional
development managers quickly became directors and ultimately,
operating chiefs, as associate talent required additional
management, leadership, and skills, and the need for lateral lawyers
grew.232 The pressure exerted on law firms from in-house counsel to
recruit, retain, and grow diverse talent also increased dramatically
during this time.233
In fact, we have observed that the post 2009 great-recession
decade saw the emergence of competency models, levels models,
modified career paths, alternative lawyer roles, a key focus on lawyer
satisfaction, and a greater retention of women lawyers, lawyers of
226.
227.
228.

See id. at 1107.
See id. at 1100.
NALP FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH & EDUCATION, KEEPING THE KEEPERS
STRATEGIES FOR ASSOCIATE RETENTION IN TIMES OF ATTRITION 23 (1998).
229. Cf. id.
230. Cf. id.
231. One can also argue that finance professionals grew in influence during this
time as well. However, recruiting and professional development professionals were
in front of hiring partners, group leaders, board members, management team
members, and associate evaluation committees, allowing them broader visibility in
the firm.
232. See NALP, supra note 228.
233. See, e.g., TWIN CITIES DIVERSITY IN PRACTICE, http://diversityinpractice.org/
(last visited Oct. 1, 2017).
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color, and LGBT lawyers.234 Additionally, these years brought the
need for more careful articulation of compensation, particularly on
parental leave, reduced hours, and bonus potential for strong
performance. Moreover, these change dynamics and the influence
of the general counsel gave rise to the emergence of the diversity
and inclusion professional.235 All of these talented professionals
became key change agents in law firms and helped pave the way for
further influence on the part of operational professionals within the
firm. Business development and marketing professionals also
became a significant change agent, as this person’s key circle of
influence included the firm rainmakers.236 The marketing function
first emerged as a coordinator-type individual who stood at the ready
to help prepare lawyers for a golf outing, update the firm brochure,
and coordinate the few events the firm hosted in a given year.237
234. See, e.g., Aisling Maki, Law Firms Implement Initiatives, Mentoring to Retain
Women Attorneys, MEM. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 14, 2017, https://www.memphisdailynews.
com/news/2017/oct/14/law-firms-implement-initiatives-mentoring-to-retain-wom
en-attorneys/.
235. See Rick Palmore, A Call to Action: Diversity in the Legal Profession, LEADERSHIP
COUNCIL ON LEGAL DIVERSITY (2004), http://www.lcldnet.org/resources/2004
-call-to-action/. A Call to Action: Diversity in the Legal Profession, authored by Rick
Palmore, is
a legal industry manifesto urging general counsel to drive diversity by
demanding results in the law firms with which they work as well as in
their departments. The initiative later grew into the Leadership Council
on Legal Diversity (LCLD), a collaboration between general counsel and
managing partners, which was formed in May 2009 and now includes
more than 225 corporate chief legal officers and law firm managing
partners. Rick was the founding chair of the LCLD’s board of directors
and continues to serve on its executive committee
Rick Palmore, DENTONS, https://www.dentons.com/en/rick-palmore (last visited
Oct. 5, 2017).
236. Investing in Rainmakers: Do Business Development Training Programs Yield ROI?,
THE ACKERT ADVISORY, https://www.ackertadvisory.com/investing-in-rainmakersdo-business-development-training-programs-yield-roi/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2017)
(“For example, an associate trainee may only bring in one small matter over the
course of a given BD training program, but her increased rainmaking potential will
yield a far more meaningful gain to the firm in the years to come.”).
237. Amanda Brady, The Evolution of Law Firm Marketing and Business Development,
L. J. NEWSL. (Dec. 2015), http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/sites/
lawjournalnewsletters/2015/12/31/the-evolution-of-law-firm-marketing-and-busin
ess-development/?slreturn=20171007215236 (“In the early days of law firm
marketing, the Associate Recruiting Manager was often also responsible for
marketing, and the function centered on events, typically associate recruiting events
as well as tickets to social and sports events.”).
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Often, that individual worked with a lawyer who was designated as
the “marketing partner” in the firm, even though the lawyer lacked
any marketing training or education. As the internet grew in
influence, the marketing professional began to oversee the firm’s
website.238 As client pressures grew, marketing began to include
business development efforts.239 During the last decade, we have
seen the business and development function grow in department
size and expertise, adding graphic designers, communication
experts, brand specialists, business development coaches, and
business development managers—all lead by a C-Level professional
with deep subject matter expertise.240
The director of finance or the chief financial officer (CFO) is
seen in some firms as the de facto COO. Chris Bull, founding
director of Kingsmead Square, notes in his chapter “Horses for
courses – The spectrum of chief operating officer roles in law firms”
in Rise of the Legal COO, that it is common for the COO role to evolve
out of the CFO role because “as a firm grows, [and as] a managing
partner becomes stretched[,] . . . the CFO demonstrates a capability
to understand and manage other support areas with substantial
financial significance.”241 Bull also states that “this evolution usually
stops some way short of the complete business responsibility.”242
Whether the CFO has responsibilities beyond the finance
department or not, this role is increasingly influential, as managing
partners and COOs increasingly rely on metrics and modeling.243
Firm leadership also expects the CFO to raise flags of warning should
an issue arise in the finances of the firm, as the CFO and her team
are likely to spot the early signs of problems.244
Additional key roles in law firm operations include the chief
information officer (CIO), the real estate and facilities
238. Id.
239. See id. (“In 2010, law firms began rehiring marketing leaders and rebuilding
their departments. However, there was a new focus on the need for targeted
business development that emphasized client relationships and actively generating
leads for new work ‘not just on sponsoring events, advertising and responding to
RFPs.”).
240. LEGAL MARKETING ASSOCIATION, https://www.legalmarketing.com (last
visited Dec. 26, 2017).
241. Chris Bull, Horses for Courses – The Spectrum of Chief Operating Officer Roles in
Law Firms, in RISE OF THE LEGAL COO 3, 9 (Laura Slater ed., 2017).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.

82

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1

professional,245 the strategy officer,246 the pricing expert,247 the
eDiscovery leader, and project managers.248 The CIO is now
expected to provide a holistic and future-looking strategic plan for
the firm’s technology needs. This includes hardware, software, bringyour-office device programs, application development, co-locations,
protecting the firm from cyber-security threats, and addressing the
ever-changing client technology needs. We should expect IT to
continue to grow as AI249 becomes more prevalent, client technology
demands increase, and the drive for efficiencies becomes a part of
every legal practice. The background and experience needed to lead
the IT function in a law firm makes finding these professionals
245. As law firms seek to maintain or reduce overhead, space efficiencies are of
key importance. Many firms are moving to one-size offices for lawyers, benching
models for operational teams, and at times office space dedicated to the operational
professional in cost saving mindset. See Cushman & Wakefield, Bright Insight: The
2017 National Legal Sector Benchmark Survey Results, June 6, 2017,
http://www.cushmanwakefield.us/en/research-and-insight/2017/lsag-bright-insig
ht/; see also Michal Ptacek, A Tour of Fish & Richarson’s New Minneapolis Office,
OFFICELOVIN’,
https://www.officelovin.com/2017/05/25/tour-fish-richardsonsnew-minneapolis-offce/.
246. At times this role is played by a practicing lawyer, but increasingly is an
operation professional focused on bringing the methodology behind careful
strategy articulation with deliverables. See, e.g., Enabling Business Transformation Via
the Facilitation of Strategy Development and Execution, ARK GRP. (May 11, 2017),
http://usa.ark-group.com/upload/event/agenda/b368cd49-01f0-4950-aae8bc159
7db4fa0.pdf.
247. As clients demand changes to law firm pricing through different fee
arrangements such as flat fees, blended rates, success fees, carefully articulated
budgets, project management updates and commoditized packaged legal work,
expertise is required with both data and experience in working on legal work as well
as the ability to explain the options to a client and communicate continually with
the client. Cf. Catherine Ho, At Law Firms, Pricing Managers are in Demand, WASH.
POST
(May
25,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
capitalbusiness/at-law-firms-pricing-managers-are-in-demand/2014/05/25/f6e880
b2-e130-11e3-8dcc-d6b7fede081a_story.html?utm_term=.b2018a5f2310;
Marg.
Bruineman, What is a Pricing Officer and Does Your Firm Need One?, CAN. L. (Jan. 5,
2015), http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/author/sandra-shutt/what-is-a-prici
ng- officer-and-does-your-firm-need-one-2729/.
248. See Mark A. Cohen, The Reluctant Rise of Project Management in Law, LEGAL
MOSAIC (Mar. 24, 2015) https://legalmosaic.com/2015/03/24/reluctant-riseproject-management-law/# (“Project Management is the application of knowledge,
skills and techniques to execute projects effectively and efficiently . . . Project
Management has many applications to the delivery of law firm services.”).
249. Artificial intelligence is the development of computer systems to provide
tasks typically performed by humans.
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somewhat like finding a unicorn. They need to have the technology
background, but more importantly, they need to translate the
“techie” ideas into a well-executed strategy that meets the needs of
the legal practice, the clients, and the operations colleagues.250
Simultaneously, the IT individual must collaborate across the firm,
then effectively communicate the strategy and implementation to
these same people.251 Hence, this role has a unique unicorn aspect.
The same can be said for the other key roles. The experience
and subject matter expertise is important for each of these
professionals, as it provides the price-of-entry credibility to the
lawyers: Do you know your stuff? Can you fix my problem? However,
the other portions of the success formula matter equally. The
professional must not only know her stuff, but must also be able to
develop a strategy, gain the lawyers’ acceptance of the strategy,
collaborate across the operations leadership, lead a team of
individuals in the execution of the strategy, effectively communicate
the work involved, and then, actually deliver the desired outcome.
While individual professional leaders with subject matter
expertise are important to a law firm operational model, it is really
the power of their collective experience and collaboration where the
rubber hits the road. This collaborative team approach is not
something that typically occurs on its own in law firms,252 but is
rather something that requires purposeful building and leading.
A. Building an Operations Team
Building a performing operations team in a law firm can take
years. As previously noted, many operations areas in law firms fall
under a loosely defined “team.” These individuals may lead only
their own functional areas, communicate only when necessary,
collaborate only occasionally, and in the worst cases, have open
warfare with each other. A key question to ask when considering
whether to build a true team of operations professionals is—do you
really need a team for the task at hand?253 In the book Senior
250. See Stephen P. Gallagher, Staffing for Law Firm Technology, A. B. A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home
/gp_solo_magazine_index/gallagr.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2017).
251. See id.
252. Departments working as silos, or interacting with each other on a need-toknow basis, are more common in law firms.
253. RUTH WAGEMAN, DEBRA A. NUNES, JAMES A. BURRUSS, & J. RICHARD HACKMAN,
SENIOR LEADERSHIP TEAMS: WHAT IT TAKES TO MAKE THEM GREAT 30 (Harv. Bus. Sch.
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Leadership Teams, the authors provide a roadmap for considering
whether to build a team.254 The key questions to ask are: Is there a
vital business need that is better met with a team versus a loose
collective of individuals focusing on their own accountabilities? Is
the organization in rapid growth? Are there areas of the business to
integrate, or are there new areas to upstream, downstream,255 or
both? Do you anticipate major capital expenditures? Is your firm
moving into a new stage of its life cycle?256 Most law firms can answer
“yes” to the majority of these questions right now.
When considering whether to create a team for a particular
group, it is worth questioning whether a team is really needed.
Patrick Lencioni notes in his book, Silos, Politics, and Turf Wars, that
he “strongly believe[s] that building a cohesive leadership team is
the first critical step that an organization must take if it is to have the
best chance of success.”257 Lencioni defines “team” as “a small
number of people with complementary skills who are committed to a
common purpose, performance goals, and an approach for which they hold
themselves mutually accountable.”258
Understanding team dynamics is important to leading a team to
successful outcomes. In 1965, Dr. Bruce Tuckman published the
well-known “stages of group development,” in which he detailed the
four necessary stages through which small groups must pass to truly
function at peak performance. These stages are forming, storming,
norming, and performing.259 In 1977, Dr. Tuckman added a fifth
stage, adjourning.260 When any member changes on the team, the
team must go through the previous stages to reestablish itself.
A leader of a team must understand these phases and know how
to support the team through them. The forming phase is the phase
in which the team comes together, as people are polite, and the role
Press 2008).
254. Id.
255. Upstream and downstream refers to where a business sits in the supply
chain. In a law firm, the terms refer to higher cost value work (upstream) versus
commoditized work (downstream). Many firms handle both.
256. Id.
257. PATRICK LENCIONI, SILOS, POLITICS AND TURF WARS 175 (Jossey-Bass 2006).
258. Jon R. Katzenbach, The Myth of the Top Management Team, 75 HARV. BUS. REV.
83, 84 n.6 (1997).
259. Bruce W. Tuckman, Developmental Sequence in Small Groups, 63 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 384, 387 (1965).
260. Bruce W. Tuckman & Mary Ann. C. Jensen, Stages of Small-Group Development
Revisited, 2 GROUP & ORG. STUD., 419, 419 (1977).
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of the leader is important to guiding the team.261 The storming
phase then occurs when team members start formulating opinions
of each other and start voicing those opinions.262 At times, there can
be very visible conflict and during this phase the team can also begin
to have conflict with the leader.263 Tuckman’s theory is that,
although some teams avoid the storming phase, the phase is
important to forming a fully functioning team.264 The role of the
leader is to help the team move through storming effectively.265 The
authors note that many law firm legal and operational teams bounce
frequently between forming and storming phases and need more
leadership to help move them to the norming stage. The norming
phase occurs when conflict and difference result in increased
intimacy and trust within the team, and cooperation among the team
members emerges.266 Many teams remain in the norming phase, as
the final leap to fully performing can take significant leadership
skills.267 The performing phase occurs when team members feel
confident in their roles and responsibilities, trust one another, and
are focused on achieving common goals.268 Focusing on common
goals based on a shared vision allows an operations team to have
significant impact.
Individual subject matter experts working in silos, or even
loosely connected groups, can have some daily impact. However, a
collective of operational professionals working together, providing
different perspectives, and collaborating with one another for a
common goal, can deliver the biggest results for a law firm. For
example, consider an IT rollout of a new piece of software. Working
in isolation, the IT team can purchase the software and work with
the software company to rollout the program to all users. However,
an IT team working within a collaborative performing operations
team can leverage the perspectives of the other operations team
members for the benefit of the firm. The finance team is involved in
the negotiation and budgeting of the purchase, the HR team
addresses the impact on the firm’s employees, the marketing and
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at 396.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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business development team provides perspectives and expertise in
communicating the software change to the firm, and the COO acts
as the project sponsor and team guide for each step of the plan
execution.
While it would be nice to conclude that most teams function at
a very high level, we observe that the reality is that most legal teams
exhibit some dysfunction and certainly do not function at their peak.
Many functional teams rarely achieve consistent and sustainable
maximum efficiency.269 Patrick Lencioni’s The Five Dysfunctions of a
Team details the ways teams exhibit dysfunction, and provides the
recipe for building a functioning team.270 Lencioni’s articulated
dysfunctions are: absence of trust, fear of conflict, lack of
commitment, avoidance of accountability, and inattention to
results.271 A team can succeed or fail if “even a single dysfunction is
allowed to flourish.”272 Lencioni notes that a strong team is one in
which team members trust each other, engage in unfiltered conflict
around ideas, commit to decisions and plans of action, hold each
other accountable, and focus on the achievement of collective
results.273 This framework provides a good roadmap for the COO to
guide his team through development. The dysfunctions framework
provides key opportunities along the way to set the tone for the team
and to work through situations and dynamics as they arise. The role
of the COO leader cannot be understated here, as he can easily add
to the dysfunction, or help the team successfully move to
functioning. A functioning operations team is a key element in law
firms’ successful change.
V. HOW ORGANIZATIONS CHANGE
The following discussion on organizational change is framed in
terms of Kurt Lewin’s unfreeze, move, refreeze model.274 A number
269. See PATRICK LENCIONI, THE FIVE DYSFUNCTIONS OF A TEAM 188–90 (JosseyBass 2002).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 189.
273. Id. at 189–90.
274. See generally Kurt Lewin, Frontiers in Group Dynamics: Concept, Method and
Reality in Social Science; Social Equilibria and Social Change, 1 HUM. REL., 5, 5–41 (1947).
But see Todd Bridgman, Kenneth G. Brown & Stephen Cummings, Unfreezing Change
as Three Steps: Rethinking Kurt Lewin’s Legacy for Change Management, 69 HUM. REL. 33,
37 (2016) (stating the proposition that Lewin did not develop the three-step model,
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of change theories exist, but the simplicity and accessibility of
Lewin’s three-step model serves the purposes of this article.275 Lewin
is seen as the “founding father of change management,” and
“academics claim that all theories of change are reducible to [his]
one idea.”276 Many believe that, more than any other person, “his
thinking has had a more pervasive impact on organization
development, both directly and indirectly.”277 His unfreeze, move,
refreeze model is regarded as the fundamental approach to thinking
about change management.278
Lewin started writing about change in 1947.279 In those earliest
years of studying organizational change, researchers were observing
the characteristically human quality that is currently associated with
lawyers and law firms—people are resistant to change.280 The
attitudes and beliefs of workers sewing pajamas in 1948 (the subject
of Lester Coch and John French’s earliest studies of Lewin’s
and that it formed after his death).
275. See Alicia Kritsonis, Comparison of Change Theories, 8 INT’L J. SCHOLARLY ACAD.
INTELL. DIVERSITY 1, 5–6 (2004) (comparing Lewin’s Three-Step Change Theory,
Lippitt’s Phases of Change Theory (“a seven-step theory that focuses more on the
role and responsibility of the change agent than on the evolution of the change
itself”), Prochaska and DiClemente’s Change Theory (“people pass through a series
of stages when change occurs . . . precontempation [sic], contemplation,
preparation, action, and maintenance”), Social Cognitive Theory (“proposes that
behavior change is affected by environmental influences, personal factors, and
attributes of the behavior itself” (citation omitted)), and the Theory of Reasoned
Action and Planned Behavior (“include[ing] the beliefs of . . . peers and . . . [the]
motivation to comply with the opinions of their peers”)); see also Tom Peters,
McKinsey 7-S Model, 28 LEADERSHIP EXCELLENCE 7 (2011) (“[T]he 7-S framework offers
a sound approach to combining all of the essential factors that sustain strong
organizations: strategy, systems, structure, skills, style, and staff—united by shared
values.”).
276. See Bridgman et al., supra note 274, at 34.
277. ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT : A JOSSEY-BASS READER 25 (Joan V. Gallos ed.,
2006).
278. We want to emphasize that we are using the model as a framework only.
We do not hold it out as a linear formula that can be followed by a change agent.
“Lewin never presented (the model) in a linear diagrammatic form and he did not
list it as bullet points. Lewin was adamant that group dynamics must not be seen in
simplistic or static terms and believed that groups were never in a steady state, seeing
them instead as being in continuous movement, albeit having periods of relative
stability . . . .” Bridgman et al., supra, note 274, at 38.
279. See Lewin, supra, note 274.
280. See Lester Coch & John R. P. French, Jr., Overcoming Resistance to Change, 1
HUM. REL., 512, 512 (1948) (asking the questions: “Why do people resist change so
strongly?” and “What can be done to overcome this resistance?”).
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theories) are relevant to what is encountered in law firms today, as
the long history of change management theories have established
principles that act as touchstones for contemporary
understanding.281 Lewin himself addressed the need for a framework
for discussing change, saying that “there is nothing as practical as a
good theory.”282 As theories of change go, Lewin’s is simple, stable,
and “still relevant to the modern world.”283 As this article explores
how operations teams can help manage change in law firms, it will
refer to the unfreeze, change, refreeze theory to orient the reader
within the change process.284 In addition to Lewin’s model, this
article will add information from two contemporary scholars: Edgar
Schein (an organizational development scholar and MIT professor)
and John Kotter (Harvard professor and author).
A. Unfreeze
The first step of the model is unfreezing, during which the
inertia of the status quo is disrupted. Unfreezing “involves
questioning the organization’s current state, and if a different state
is desired, then equilibrium needs to be destabilized before old
behavior is discarded.”285 The status quo is described as a state of
equilibrium held in balance by “driving and restraining forces.”286
Change is “a profound psychological dynamic process that involve[s]
painful unlearning . . . and difficult relearning as one . . . attempt[s]
to restructure one’s thoughts, perceptions, feelings, and
attitudes.”287
281. The earliest research was conducted at the Harwood Manufacturing
Corporation, a pajama manufacturer in Marion, Virginia. Id. at 512.
282. Katherine W. McCain, “Nothing as Practical as a Good Theory” Does Lewin’s
Maxim Still Have Salience in the Applied Social Sciences? ASIST 2015,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pra2.2015.145052010077/full.
283. Bernard Burnes, Kurt Lewin and the Planned Approach to Change: A Reappraisal, 41 J. MGMT. STUD. 977, 977 (2004).
284. Another example of a three-step change process is provided by William
Bridges: (1) letting go of the old ways and the old identity people had; (2) going
through an in-between time when the old is gone but the new isn’t fully operational;
and (3) coming out of the transition and making a new beginning. WILLIAM
BRIDGES, MANAGING TRANSITIONS 4–5 (3d ed. 2009).
285. Matthew W. Ford & Bertie M. Greer, Profiling Change: An Empirical Study of
Change Process Patterns, 42 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 420, 424 (2006).
286. Edgar H. Schein, Kurt Lewin’s Change Theory in the Field and in the Classroom:
Notes Toward a Model of Managed Learning, 1 REFLECTIONS 59, 59 (1999).
287. Id.
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Edgar Schein breaks the unfreezing step into three phases,
which is helpful in understanding how to disrupt inertia. The first
phase is disconfirmation, which is marked by “some form of
dissatisfaction or frustration generated by data that disconfirm our
expectations or hopes.”288 For lawyers in law firms, this might come
in the form of trade articles predicting market changes, dire
warnings delivered at CLE courses, dwindling billable hours, or
explicit actions by clients which demonstrate that the current
business model is not sustainable. Schein stresses that mere
information is not always enough because people have a variety of
psychological manipulations which subconsciously reinforce the
status quo.289 Confirmation bias, for example, occurs when a person
“selectively gathers, or gives undue weight to, evidence that supports
one’s position while neglecting to gather, or discounting, evidence
that would tell against it.”290 Another psychological tendency is
biased assimilation, which occurs when “individuals . . . dismiss and
discount empirical evidence that contradicts their initial views but
. . . derive support from evidence, of no greater probativeness [sic],
that seems consistent with their views.”291 These are just two
examples of how one interprets the world so that “[i]nformation that
is inconsistent with [our] expectations or beliefs is discounted and
scrutinized more carefully than is expectation-congruent data.”292
Consequently, merely telling lawyers that the legal market is
changing is insufficient to disconfirm their belief that the status quo
is sustainable.
In order to unfreeze and break loose of the status quo, lawyers
must “accept the information and connect it to something [they]
care about.”293 You may ask yourself what lawyers care about. Perhaps
money comes to mind, or perhaps jobs, careers, or the firm’s legacy.
288. Id. at 60.
289. Id. (providing the following examples: “ignor[ing] the information,
dismiss[ing] it as irrelevant, blam[ing] the undesired outcome on others or fate, or
. . . simply deny[ing] its validity”).
290. Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998).
291. Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2099 (1979).
292. Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should be Good
Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL.
437, 454 (2008).
293. Schein, supra note 286, at 60.
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Whatever the thing is, Schein writes that in order to unfreeze, the
disconfirming information “must arouse what we can call ‘survival
anxiety,’ or the feeling that if we do not change, we will fail to meet
our needs or fail to achieve some goals or ideals that we have set for
ourselves.”294 So in order to unfreeze and start the change process,
lawyers must be convinced that the thing they care about is going to
go away unless they change.
Survival anxiety is Schein’s second phase of unfreezing. Survival
anxiety is scary. It is scary to be told that your job is going to be taken
over by a robot,295 that your law firm partnership is doomed for
failure,296 or that nonlawyers are going to start taking your work.297
When lawyers receive this type of information, they react defensively
and often become determined to hold fast to their beliefs more than
ever. This is natural. Schein calls it “‘learning anxiety,’ or the feeling
that if we allow ourselves to enter a learning or change process, if we
admit to ourselves and others that something is wrong or imperfect,
we will lose our effectiveness, our self-esteem, and maybe even our
identity.”298 Schein writes that “[l]earning anxiety is the fundamental
restraining force which can go up in direct proportion to the amount
of disconfirmation, leading to the maintenance of the equilibrium
by defensive avoidance of the disconfirming information.”299
Readers of this article may feel like the authors are getting into
some psychological hypotheses which are too touchy-feely for the
reality of the legal practice—that law firm leaders might not buy into
all of this. This reaction is the reason that law firms need a
professional manager leading change initiatives. “[E]motional
intelligence is the differentiating factor for successful leadership,”
and lawyers do not learn these competencies in law school.300 One
study has found that “self-awareness and self-management are

294.
295.

Id.
See Steve Lohr, A.I. Is Doing Legal Work. But It Won’t Replace Lawyers, Yet., N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/19/technology/
lawyers-artificial-intelligence.html.
296. See Jordan Weissmann, Why Law Firms Are Rigged to Fail, THE ATLANTIC (May
31, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/05/why-law-firmsare-rigged-to-fail/257843/.
297. See Legal Technicians, supra note 27.
298. Schein, supra note 286, at 60.
299. Id.
300. See Smith & Marrow, supra note 163, at 36 (listing four competencies: selfawareness, self-management, social awareness, and relationship management).
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significant predictors of change management skills.”301 This is
because “businesses, families, and governments do not change;
people within these organizations do.”302 By identifying the presence
of learning anxiety and designing tactics to manage it, the COO can
help calm it—particularly if the leader understands how to prepare
the lawyer personality to adapt to change.303
This article primarily explored the use of the operations team
in the law firm. Still, note that for true success, law firms should
employ additional tactics, including collaboration with the
managing partner and, ideally, with the partnership itself. Are
lawyers afraid of artificial intelligence? There are IT professionals to
help. Afraid of alternative fee arrangements? There are finance and
pricing professionals for that. Afraid of Limited License Legal
Technicians? There are human resources professionals. The COO
leads this team of specialists and provides what Schein calls
“psychological safety.”304 Advanced use of this theory includes the
managing partner and other lawyer leaders supporting and learning
from these subject matter experts in the firm, rather than trying to
learn the area on their own.
The last phase of unfreezing involves creating psychological
safety.305 The key to unfreezing, and ultimately change management,
is the ability to balance the threat of disconfirming data with
psychological safety in a way that allows survival anxiety to be felt and
motivated by change.306 Schein outlines several tactics that help in
creating psychological safety.307 Law firms will be interested in the
301. Rekha Dhingra & Bijender K. Punia, Relational Analysis of Emotional
Intelligence and Change Management: A Suggestive Model for Enriching Change
Management Skills, 20 VISION: J. BUS. PERSP. 312, 318 (2016).
302. MARVIN
WASHINGTON
ET
AL.,
SUCCESSFUL
ORGANIZATIONAL
TRANSFORMATION: THE FIVE CRITICAL ELEMENTS 15 (Bus. Expert Press, LLC 2011).
303. Larry Richard, Herding Cats: The Lawyer Personality Revealed, 29 REP. TO
LEGAL MGMT. 1 (Aug. 2002) (finding that lawyers have consistent personality traits).
By looking at extensive data of lawyer personality types using the Caliper instrument,
Richard finds that lawyers typically have high skepticism, a high sense of urgency,
lower sociability than the average person, low resilience, and a high need for
autonomy. Id. at 4, 9.
304. Schein, supra note 286, at 60.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 61.
307. See id. According to Schein, “tactics that change agents [should] employ to
create psychological safety” and reduce learning anxiety include: “working in
groups, creating parallel systems that allow some relief from day-to-day work
pressures, providing practice fields in which errors are embraced rather than
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change-management model developed by Ann Rainhart and
Melanie Green during the creation of Faegre Baker Daniels—when
Faegre & Benson, LLP merged with Baker & Daniels, LLP in 2012.
This model provides a twelve-step approach to unfreezing, while
creating an evolution of change that minimizes skepticism and
maximizes lawyer adoption.308
While Schein provides advice on managing the social and
psychological dynamics during organizational change, a more
contemporary author, John Kotter of Harvard Business School, has
an eight-step model that provides specific guidance on certain
actions that the change process should include.309 Kotter’s eight-step
process indicates that unfreezing may be both the most complicated
and most involved of Lewin’s three phases. Lewin’s unfreezing phase
operates in parallel with the first four of Kotter’s eight-step
approach, specifically: establishing a sense of urgency, forming a
powerful guiding coalition, creating a vision, and communicating
the vision.310

feared, providing positive visions to encourage the learner, breaking the learning
process into manageable steps, and providing on-line coaching and help . . . .” Id.
308. See Ann Rainhart & Melanie Green, The Athrú Model for Law Firm
Operational Management (2012) (on file with author). The Athrú Model for Law
Firm Operational Management by Rainhart-Green details twelve steps to move from
conception, to unfreezing, to action, to acceptance. The twelve steps are identifying
initiative, assessing impact to others, seeking reaction of others, road testing with
operational team, seeking leadership buy-in, refining based on feedback, test
marketing with pilot group, assessing reaction again, refining again based on
feedback, empowering others, setting the stage for launch, and finally releasing
initiative or change. Id.
309. Compare JOHN P. KOTTER, LEADING CHANGE, 20 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Press 1996),
with Mark Hughes, Leading Changes: Why Transformation Explanations Fail,
LEADERSHIP Vol. 12(4), 449–69 (2012) (acknowledging that Kotter’s Leading Change
is one of Time magazine’s top 25 most influential business books and describing it
as a landmark leadership study, but arguing that Kotter’s formula “paradoxically
discourage[s] change”).
310. Compare KOTTER, supra note 309, at 21 (indicating steps 1–4 include
“examining the market and competitive realities, identifying and discussing crises,
potential crises, or major opportunities, putting together a group with enough
power to lead the change, getting the group to work together like a team, creating
a vision to help direct the change effort and developing strategies for achieving that
vision”), with Schein, supra note 286, at 59–60 (“For change to occur, this force field
had to be altered under complex psychological conditions because, as was often
noted, just adding a driving force toward change often produced an immediate
counterforce to maintain the equilibrium.”).
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Lewin’s
Three- Kotter’s Eight-Step Model
Phase Model
Phase 1 Step 1 - Establishing a sense of urgency
Unfreezing
Step 2 - Creating a powerful guiding
coalition
Step 3 - Developing a vision and strategy
Step 4 - Communicating the change vision

Phase 2 - Changing

Step 5 - Empowering employees for broadbased action
Step 6 - Generating short-term wins

Phase 3 Refreezing

Step 7 - Consolidating gains and producing
more change
Step 8 - Anchoring new approaches in the
culture

The first step in Kotter’s organizational change model,
unfreezing, is establishing a sense of urgency.311 Complacency,
Kotter writes, is the opposite of urgency.312 Change requires work,
and “[w]ith complacency high, transformations usually go nowhere
because few people are even interested in working on the change
problem.”313 Kotter writes that urgency is not synonymous with
anxiety, cautioning that driving up anxiety will “create even more
resistance to change.”314 Without exploring anxiety and resistance at
great length, Kotter’s argument echoes Schein’s survival anxiety and
“defensive avoidance.”315 Kotter offers a stern warning that we
cannot stress enough: “Never underestimate the magnitude of the
forces that reinforce complacency and that help maintain the status
quo.”316 This is Kodak inertia. You are warned. Ask yourself if this
stunningly relevant observation by Kotter applies to your firm:

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Id. KOTTER, supra note 309, at 35.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 42.
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Much of the problem here is related to historical victories–
for the firm as a whole, for departments, and for
individuals. Past success provides too many resources,
reduces our sense of urgency, and encourages us to turn
inward. For individuals, it creates an ego problem; for
firms, a cultural problem. Big egos and arrogant cultures
reinforce . . . complacency, which, . . . can keep the
urgency rate low even in an organization faced with major
challenges and managed by perfectly intelligent and
reasonable people.317
Creating urgency is a leadership challenge. Since law firms are
notoriously slow to change, fostering a sense of urgency is perhaps
the leadership challenge. As Dr. Larry Richard notes, the lawyer
personality includes a high sense of urgency.318 However, that sense
of urgency is often tied to completing one’s work for a client or for
someone else to attend to the lawyer’s needs versus a sense of
urgency to adapt to change.319 Likely, the key to creating a sense of
urgency in a law firm is to garner the attention of lawyers by using
clearly articulated facts which provide the detail needed to create
anxiety.320 After all, lawyers want evidence. It is not difficult to
imagine what evidence may cause enough anxiety inflection to gain
the attention of lawyers—data around large-scale litigation slowing
within a firm, market information about changes in litigation, or a
valued client discussing possible litigation changes. Dr. Richard
further notes that a key component to creating urgency is having
social proof from respected partners or experts that the anxiety is
warranted.321
Kotter warns that creating urgency and reducing complacency
are absolutely necessary. The next three steps, which make up the
rest of Lewin’s unfreezing phase, is extremely difficult without
urgency.322 Urgency is particularly important in a law firm where
consensus among partners is expected, assumed, or maybe forced. It
is important to listen to dissenting voices, solicit outside opinions,
and have many conversations in order to avoid a false consensus.
Failure to identify insincere unanimity may be realized a few years

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Id. at 41–42.
Larry Richard, Herding Cats, supra note 303, at 4.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See generally KOTTER, supra note 309, at 37–38.
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later when the support for, and success of, change-efforts diminishes.
Rainhart and Green’s Athrú model focuses on this dynamic in
multiple steps,323 reinforcing that the need to hear various opinions
and incorporate them into the change cannot be underestimated.
Ignoring dissenting voices can endanger the entire unfreezing
process.
Kotter’s second step requires creating a powerful guiding
coalition.324 He acknowledges that “major change is so difficult to
accomplish, [that] a powerful force is required to sustain the
process.”325 Specifically, Kotter calls out lone leaders as lacking
information necessary “to make good nonroutine decisions,” and
refers to weak committees as one of least effective means of
“anchor[ing] new approaches deep [within] the organization’s
culture.”326 In a slow-moving world, like the pre-2008 legal market,
unplanned and unhurried change was both an acceptable and
feasible strategy.327 But the current legal market is changing too fast
for such delay. Kotter’s suggestion for a powerful coalition is a team
of influential people who are “truly informed and committed to key
decisions,” capable of maintaining urgency and moving the change
process forward.328 As noted earlier, the collaborative power of a
team is required to execute change properly. Just as the law firm
itself requires both leadership and management, the guiding change
coalition needs to balance leadership and management.
Ann Rainhart writes that creating a powerful guiding coalition
within a law firm requires critical nuance “due to the partnership
structure and the stratified leadership model within law firms.”329
The law firm partnership structure historically means that each
partner views him or herself as the CEO of their own business unit.330
323. Step 3, step 5, step 8 and step 10.
324. KOTTER supra note 309, at 51.
325. Id. at 55.
326. Id. at 52.
327. While it is impossible to point to a specific timeframe when the legal market
changed, the 2008–2009 economic recession is a safe bet. See Eli Wald, The Economic
Downturn and the Legal Profession, Foreword: The Great Recession and the Legal Profession,
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2051, 2051 (2010) (“2008-2009 will be remembered . . . as an
inflection point for . . . the legal profession.”); id. at 2052, n.7–8 (supporting the
argument that the recession will have lasting impact on the legal market).
328. KOTTER, supra note 309, at 55–56.
329. Ann Rainhart, The Evolving Practice of Law: Competency Development in Law
Firm Combinations, 11 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 87, 91 (2013).
330. See id.
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“No one can tell me what to do. I know what is best for my client and
my practice” is often the historically rallying cry from a successful
lawyer. And historically, this has worked quite well. However, it is not
feasible to have one hundred or more self-proclaimed “CEOs”
making individual business decisions for the entire enterprise, nor is
it possible to run a business without someone making key decisions
during a time of significant market change. The complexity of a
partnership model suggests that the answer is not at the end of these
choices, but rather in the middle. Patrick J. McKenna states that
“many law firms are populated with professionals that are so
preoccupied with their particular area of specialty that they are
remarkably out of touch with the wider world.”331 McKenna
concludes that it becomes increasingly important that “every
member of firm management maintain[] a running dialogue on the
meaning of significant events and trends, and that they use their
understanding of those trends to develop consensus on refining the
direction and strategy of the firm.”332 The key here is for the group
of lawyers and professionals in leadership positions within a firm to
have a consistent and regular drumbeat around firm direction and
strategy, and to speak from the same script.333 Chaos ensues if the
leadership team is not on the same page, or worse, if there is no
script at all.
Kotter’s third step is developing a vision and strategy.334 A good
vision serves three purposes. First, the vision identifies the
destination and provides general directions for getting to the
destination. The law firm is still in the unfreezing phase, so they are
getting a glimpse of what is next and seeing the step towards which
they need to move.335 Second, the vision motivates people to move.336
Third, the vision “coordinates the actions of different people” by
providing individuals with general directions so they can make

331. Patrick J. McKenna, Seeing the Future First–Analyzing Strategic Trends, in 2020
VISION: THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVICES 2 (Laura Slater ed., 2d ed. 2016).
332. Id. at 3.
333. Id.
334. See KOTTER, supra note 309, at 68. Even though Kotter does not consistently
use the phrase “vision statement” and he writes about vision as a thing that exists
independent of a vision statement, this step is about developing a vision statement.
Id. A vision statement should provide clear focus and direction for the business. A
mission statement usually describes how the vision will be achieved. Id.
335. Id. at 68.
336. Id. at 68–69.
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decisions without constantly consulting superiors.337 Some writers
describe vision as a picture of success,338 while others have said it is
the organization’s “ultimate purpose—the reason for its
existence.”339
A hasty or hyperbolic vision statement can misguide or derail an
organization, so this assignment should not be taken lightly.340
Kotter calls the process of creating a vision a “messy, difficult, and
sometimes emotionally charged exercise.”341 It is a time-consuming
process. Kotter indicates that a vision could take six months to
develop and require a few hundred hours of work.342 Others have
written that it could take years.343 Because the vision must be
completely developed, this step cannot be rushed or skipped, lest the
organization find itself starting over and losing time and progress.
An accurate vision, as a future goal, allows everyone to see the gap
between the present and the future.344 Analysis of the gap enables an
organization to identify key results areas (KRA) that can be
measured by key performance indicators (KPI).345 From there,
things can start to fall into place in terms of strategy to obtain the
vision. The KRAs can be analyzed to establish the actual change
effort based on three characteristics: “the magnitude of change, the
urgency for change, and the stakeholder impact on change.”346
Additionally, the KPIs can be analyzed to measure progress.347 In
sum, vision matters—so do it right.
Developing a vision within a law firm is complex because law
firms historically have distributed leadership as a collective of
practices versus coordinated client services.348 This style results in the
337. Id. at 69.
338. John P. Kotter, Accelerate!, 90 HARV. BUS. REV. 44, 52 (2012).
339. David Collis, Lean Strategy, 94 HARV. BUS. REV. 62, 66 (2016).
340. KOTTER, supra note 309, at 72 (writing that an effective vision must be:
imaginable, desirable, feasible, focused, flexible, and communicable).
341. Id. at 79.
342. Id. at 83, 89 (“[T]he boss then drafted a second statement, which was
discussed with his guiding coalition over a six-month period . . . [A] few hundred
hours collecting information, digesting it, considering alternatives, and eventually
making choices.”).
343. See Bertolini, supra note 14, at 101 (giving the examples of Netflix, Nestle,
Adobe, and Xerox).
344. See WASHINGTON, supra note 207, at 46.
345. See Id.
346. Id. at 46–47.
347. Id.
348. See, e.g., Dorsey & Whitney Industries and Practices, DORSEY AND WHITNEY,
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inability to see the reason for a vision at all, and leaves lawyer leaders
without the necessary skills to develop a clearly articulated vision. An
organization with these characteristics will struggle to satisfy a group
of partners demanding consensus. But you cannot give up on vision
just because it is difficult.
Kotter’s fourth step, the last in unfreezing an organization, is
communicating the change vision.349 The goal is for people in the
organization to accept the vision.350 Without success at this fourth
step, lawyers and operations may quietly rebel or explicitly mutiny,
and the organization is going to stay frozen. As Patrick Stroh warns,
“[i]f vision is unclear, execution will be unclear and goals will not be
attained.”351 This is going to lead to wasted time and having to
rework projects.
An effectively communicated vision motivates people to work
and focuses their efforts toward the vision’s goals. This
communication is not accomplished by sending an email, or posting
a vision statement on the firm’s intranet. William Bridges, in his
book Managing Transitions, warns that vision is:
[U]sed in an almost mystical way to refer to something that
has the power—almost by itself—to revitalize an
organization and to realign its people . . . Too many visions
are pure fantasy that simply alienate leaders from their
more down-to-earth followers. Just as relatively few people
can be swept up and moved to action by an idea alone, so
it is with only a vision to go on.352
Communicating vision requires a planned multi-faceted
approach. Kotter identifies the following elements for effective
communication of vision:
•
Simplicity: All jargon and technobabble must be
eliminated;
•
Metaphor, analogy, and example: A verbal picture is
worth a thousand words;
•
Multiple forums: Big meetings and small, memos and
newspapers, formal and informal interaction—all are
effective for spreading the word;

https://www.dorsey.com/services (last visited Nov. 7, 2017).
349. KOTTER, supra note 309, at 85.
350. Id.
351. PATRICK STROH, BUSINESS STRATEGY 110 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2014).
352. WILLIAM BRIDGES, MANAGING TRANSITIONS 75 (Da Capo Press 2009).
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Repetition: Ideas sink in deeply only after they have been
heard many times;
•
Leadership by example: Behavior from important people
that is inconsistent with the vision overwhelms other forms
of communication;
•
Explanation of seeming inconsistencies: Unaddressed
inconsistencies undermine the credibility of all
communication; and
•
Give-and-take: Two-way communication is always more
powerful than one-way communication.353
As with his initial three steps, Kotter warns that “[i]f people
don’t accept a vision, the next two steps in the transformation
process—empowering individuals for broad-based action and
creating short-term wins—will fail.”354
•

B. Move
After completing the first four steps of Kotter’s eight-step
model, an organization also has effectively accomplished the first
phase of Lewin’s three-phase model; namely, the firm is technically
unfrozen. Lawyers are then instilled with confidence and have the
psychological safety required to start the move step. It is important
to understand that the “move” phase is not where the heavy lifting
actually takes place, nor where the “real change” happens.355 The
unfreezing process makes up half of Kotter’s eight steps and
Rainhart and Green’s nine steps. Lewin’s moving phase coincides
with the next two of Kotter’s steps: empowering others to act on the
vision, and generating short term wins.356 The Rainhart-Green Athrú
model also details a final step toward movement as empowering
voices. Lewin refers to this phase as “movement” because the forces
of change “move the organization toward a new and improved
state.”357 In this phase “new values, behaviours and structures replace
the old . . . and it is [an] action-oriented stage based upon the
efficacy of the first phase.”358

353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

See KOTTER, supra note 309, at 90.
Id. at 100.
See Hughes, supra note 214, at 455.
Id. at 453, 455.
Ford & Greer, supra note 190, at 428.
Dhingra & Punia, supra note 206, at 313–14.
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During the unfreezing phase, the guiding coalition delivered
the vision to everyone in the firm, and all of those people are now
unfrozen and ready to move. A strong vision even has them ready to
move in the right direction. Now, leadership will empower everyone
to act on their own, and to move in the direction towards which
leadership has previously guided them. Kotter’s fifth step is
empowering employees for broad based action. Kotter writes that
most of empowerment is about removing “barriers to the
implementation of the change vision.”359 He recommends four areas
of concentration: removing structural barriers, providing training,
applying systems to the vision, and dealing with troublesome
supervisors.360
Leaders should include everyone in the firm in the
empowerment step. All lawyers and all operations staff should
participate in creating success. Front-line staff members may see
things that lawyers and operation leaders never see. Ensure success
by creating a structure for celebrating innovative ideas, particularly
when a team is involved in driving new change forward. Law firms
often have minimal bureaucracy, but there are often traditional
processes that have developed over many years. Allow people to
question why things are done the way they are. Reinforce an
environment in which the “way it has always been done” is not the
way it needs to be done anymore.
Kotter’s sixth step, the one that ushers the organization out of
Lewin’s move phase and into the refreezing phase, is generating
short-term wins.361 Richard Susskind writes that “most lawyers are
convinced by evidence and not argument.”362 Susskind recommends
that leaders “need to generate evidence from within—from pilots,
experiments, and testing ideas out on sympathetic clients.”363 When
Kotter writes that wins need to be “generated” he does not mean that
evidence needs to be planted; rather that it should be planned.
Short-term wins are the evidence needed to provide the credibility
that sustains change efforts in the long-term.364 These wins should
not be latent or ambiguous. They need to be visible so that many
people can observe and believe in the success, and unambiguous so
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

KOTTER, supra note 309, at 103.
Id. at 106–14.
Id. at 122–24 (describing the role of short-term wins).
SUSSKIND, supra note 12, at 70.
Id. at 70.
Cf. id. at 69.
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that no one can argue that the win is something other than evidence
of success. The wins also need to be “clearly related to the change
effort” so they do not appear to be random or coincidental.365 In
other words, these wins are planned milestones that reinforce the
vision is sound and that the short-term sacrifices are paying off.
These wins not only provide leadership with encouragement, but
they can also stand in opposition to naysayers and cynics.
Additionally, the wins build momentum to carry the firm into the
refreezing phase.366
C. Refreeze
Change agents367 must be careful to not stop too long while
celebrating short-term wins. In order to press forward, leadership
needs to maintain urgency. The refreezing phase, the third and final
phase in the change process, “requires activities to institutionalize
the new behaviors and attitudes and to stabilize the organization at
a new equilibrium.”368 These activities take place in Kotter’s seventh
step: consolidating gains and producing more change. “Until
change practices attain a new equilibrium and have been driven into
the culture, they can be very fragile.”369 It is important to understand
the timeline here—”transformation can become a huge exercise that
plays itself out over years, not months.”370 William McComb, former
CEO of Liz Claiborne, wrote that “transformation is an era, not an
event.” He urges leaders to take the long-view, and that when we
“expect transformation to define an era,” we “figure out how to
sustain a vision.”371
Law firms do not have a reputation for creating sustainable
change. As we have described, change requires planning, and

365. See KOTTER, supra note 309, at 122.
366. See id. at 129–30. Kotter makes three observations about why people do not
plan and deliver short term wins: (1) people are too overwhelmed to find the time
and attention to plan short terms wins, (2) people are accustomed to the binary
decision of short-term vs. long-term goals and do not believe that they can deliver
both, and (3) lack of skill or buy-in on the part of management. Id.
367. Change agents are guiding coalition members (lawyer leaders and
operations professionals).
368. Ford & Greer, supra note 190, at 424.
369. KOTTER, supra note 309, at 139.
370. Id. at 150.
371. William L. McComb, Transformation Is an Era, Not an Event, 92 HARV. BUS.
REV. 34, (2014).
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lawyers are not typically experienced planners. A 2011 Altman Weil
survey found that “on a scale of 0 to 10, firms rate the effectiveness
of Practice Group planning at 6.0 and the effectiveness of plan
implementation at a meager 5.6.”372 Unfortunately, there is no magic
formula that can be applied to ensure sustainable change. To some
extent, change agents will rely on momentum built up from the
previous six steps in order to carry through the times when change
comes slower. Consider the following practical actions:
•
Continue to communicate the vision and find new areas to
apply it. Every meeting, announcement, portal page,
award, etc., should be evaluated for how the vision can be
incorporated.
•
Plan for continued wins and celebrate success.
•
Develop structure (software, workflow, training) to
support
new initiatives.
•
Leaders need to be role models, confirming their
dedication
to change through their actions.
•
Encourage and solicit feedback. Conduct 360 degree
evaluations.373
Firm leadership and management should be ever mindful that
they are leading a firm in transition. Their priority as the guiding
coalition and change agents should be to look for every opportunity
to influence the firm’s culture and spread the belief that successful
change is happening. Leadership should pay heed to the
management adage that culture eats strategy, because when the
strategic leaders get sloppy or weary, that old culture will rapidly pull
the firm back to the old status quo.374

372. Thomas S. Clay & Eric A. Seeger, 2011 Practice Group Performance, ALTMAN
WEIL FLASH SURV. ii (2011).
373. A 360 degree evaluation provides feedback from the people who work
around an individual (peer, manager, direct-reports). In many situations these
evaluations are confidential, although in law firms confidentiality is often provided
through direct-reports, versus the feedback from other lawyers. These evaluations
are increasingly used in law firm management and leadership positions.
374. The quote, “culture eats strategy for breakfast,” is usually (though
dubiously) attributed to Peter Drucker. Edgar Schein has been writing that “culture
determines and limits strategy” since at least 1985, in the first edition of his book,
Organizational Culture and Leadership. See EDGAR SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
AND LEADERSHIP 34 (Jossey-Bass ed., 1st ed. 1985).
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The last step in Kotter’s model is anchoring new approaches in
the culture.375 This step requires the firm’s culture to change. This
is a daunting prospect, as the persistent and enduring nature of law
firm culture was the initial cause of stasis. Frankly, this stasis was
successful for quite some time; over a hundred years for many
American law firms.376 But leadership has trod this road already. The
guiding coalition has already unfrozen the firm and that key work
can be recycled here. Recall and retell the stories which provided
evidence about the threats to safety, and remind people of the tactics
that will ensure survival—by adding new and improved facts.
As the market changes, the stakeholders in the firm may see the
threats, but wins within the firm can shore up psychological safety.
The result is a supported and evolving sustainability maintained by a
careful balancing of threats and solutions, which the coalition can
achieve by recasting the new or realized threats as opportunities.
Leadership and management should support the sustainability by
monitoring, intervening, and reminding the stakeholders of the
vision.
VI. CONCLUSION
The opportunity to embrace change and look for new ways to
deliver exceptional legal services is at our collective doorsteps.
Clients are expecting faster, cheaper, and better legal advice and
business outcomes. Generations are expecting new things from their
workplaces. Technology is changing the way we work and deliver
results daily. New business entities are entering the marketplace
looking to capture market-share from law firms. Professionals are
emerging within law firms who are poised to help firms address the
increasing complexity of the world in which we practice and operate
our businesses. Law firms that strategically determine their
leadership structures and partner collaboratively with subject matter
operational professionals will lead in the changing market.
Successful collaboration requires highly functioning teams aligned
with a business strategy. However, collaboration is not enough.
Additionally, teams must proactively lead their firms through change
initiatives in ways that build, not destroy, culture.

375. KOTTER, supra note 309, at 53.
376. See, e.g., William D. Henderson, Rise and Fall, THE AM. LAW. (May 31, 2012),
https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/almID/1202555054300/.
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Organizational change is difficult, and the characteristics of the
lawyer personality make change in law firms uniquely challenging.
The path of least resistance is to stay frozen and double down on the
successes that got us this far. But the changes that are coming are
not going to slow down. If anything, the changes are going to speed
up, and we will encounter innovations that no one saw coming.377
Law firm leadership needs to react with agility, by rapidly making
decisions, and moving when inevitable opportunities arise. Lone
leaders are incapable of absorbing, interpreting, and acting on the
barrage of information in today’s market. Teams of capable
operations leaders are the agents for change. They are the people
who have the depth of knowledge required to partner with law firm
leadership to move their firms forward.
Perhaps a law firm will not be the next Apple or Amazon. But
the legal market is going to change so drastically that soon, a firm
will be “the Amazon or the Apple of legal services.” That sounds
much better than “the Kodak of law firms.”

377. See SUSSKIND, supra note 12, at 11 (explaining that AI has the potential to
manifest phenomena that no one predicted—these are things that we do not even
have a paradigm for developing based on our human understanding of the world).
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